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Vested or Distributed Value, Post-Computation Procedures and a Lien in Limbo. Designated Orders, October 22-26

Posted on Nov. 8, 2018

This week’s designated order post is brought to us by Professor Samantha Galvin from the University of Denver Sturm School of Law. The second order she describes involves one of those technical procedures on which it is easy to make a mistake. Here, the mistake is by respondent’s counsel but the fix is also easy. Keith

During the week of October 25, 2018 there were four orders designated. Three are discussed below. The only order not discussed (here) addresses a trial transcript that was incorrectly attached to a joint status report.

Vested or Distributed Value

Docket 10488-10: Rui-Kang Zhang & Jua-Fei Chen v. C.I.R. (here)

First is the most substantive of the orders designated during my week. This case is about the value of life insurance policies that were distributed to petitioners in 2004. Petitioners and respondent agree the distribution created taxable income, but the amount is in dispute. The Court analyzes whether respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Petitioners were shareholders and employees of an S corporation that had a benefit plan and trust agreement paid for by the corporation which provided life insurance for petitioners. The corporation took deductions for the cost of the two policies, which were owned by a non-exempt trust. The IRS began scrutinizing plans like this because they often consisted of multiple single-employer plans dressed up as a single multiple-employer plan and used to obtain tax advantages under sections 419 and 491A.

In the present case, petitioners’ corporation wound down its involvement in this plan in 2004 and petitioners were entitled to receive a share of the plan’s assets. The plan administrator transferred ownership of the life insurance policies from the plan’s trustee to the individual petitioners. Petitioners reported the plan’s fair market value at distribution as $160,000 (this is the net value after subtracting the policies’ surrender charges) and a severance cash distribution of $30,000, but the IRS argues that the total amount should be closer to $550,000.

Because the policies were owned by a non-exempt trust, section 402(b) is used to determine the value of the policies, but the statutory cross references are particularly important. Section 402(b)(1) governs the value of an employee’s rights to assets still held in trust at the time those rights become vested, and cross references section 83, which states the value is the fair market value of such property determined without regard to any lapse restrictions.

Whereas section 402(b)(2) governs the value of assets that are distributed and not still held in trust, and cross references section 72, which states the value is the “amount actually distributed.” This was defined in Schwab v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 120 (2011), aff’d, 715 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) as the fair market value of what was actually distributed (taking into account the taxpayer’s initial investment, insurance rates, and the dates covered after the distribution).

In other words, the amount included in petitioners’ table income should either be the vested value or the distributed value. Respondent argues that both sections of 402(b) should apply and petitioners should include the higher vested value as income, because once the corporation notified the plan of the withdrawal the petitioners became beneficial owners which created a vesting event that was later followed by a distribution event.

Court says this is counterintuitive because the same property cannot be both distributed and be owned by a trustee for the benefit of the person to whom it is distributed. Respondent’s logic would also make section 402(b)(2) superfluous because it would make all distributions of pension assets taxable in a two-step process: first, taxable as vested when the plan cuts the check (which make it transferable and not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture) and then, taxable as distributed when the taxpayer actually receives the payment.

The Court identifies four relevant cases on this issue and determines that section 402(b)(2) should apply because the policies were distributed to and owned by the individual taxpayers. This means that the amount included in petitioners’ income should be the fair market value of what was actually distributed.

The Court denies respondent’s motion for summary judgment and order the parties to file a status report about whether the parties will settle or go to trial.

Post-Computation Procedures

Docket No. 14704-14: Damon R. Becnel v. CIR (here)

In this order the Court clarifies the proper procedure to be used when a petitioner is not responsive after the IRS submits computations. The Court released its opinion in this case but was waiting on the computations before it could enter the final decision. Petitioner has not approved the computations but it is unclear whether petitioner’s lack of approval is intentional, if he is simply nonresponsive, or if there is some misunderstanding.

Respondent moves for an entry of decision, but that is not actually the proper procedure to use in this situation. Computations are governed by Tax Court rule 155. Rule 155(b) states that when there is an absence of agreement between the parties the clerk will serve upon the opposite party a notice of the filing of computations and if the opposite party fails to object or submit alternative computations, then the Court may enter a decision in accordance with the computations already submitted.

In this case, the petitioner was never given notice so the Court recharacterizes IRS’s motion, orders the clerk to serve the petitioner with notice, and will enter a decision in accordance to the computations if petitioner fails to respond.

A Lien in Limbo

Docket: 681-18L, Douglas C. Hendriks v. CIR (here)

Next the Court evaluates the undisputed facts to determine whether to grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment in a collection due process case.

The petitioner filed two CDP hearing requests one in response to an intent to levy, and another in response to the intent to file a notice of federal tax lien. The IRS only responded to and issued a notice of determination for the levy CDP request, but did not respond to nor issue a notice of determination on the lien filing.

The Court finds that the lack of information about the lien CDP request is a genuine issue of material fact that could result in a remand to appeals. As a result, summary judgment is not appropriate under these circumstances and the Court denies respondent’s motion.

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