Intentionally Wrong Form Not Fraudulent Filing of Information Return?

When a taxpayer receives an accidentally wrong information return, it is natural for that person to be frustrated.  It creates filing problems, and usually it is impossible to get a corrected return.  When a taxpayer receives an intentionally incorrect information return, they usually freak out.  Cases coming out of Section 7434, which allows a taxpayer to make civil claims against the issuer of an information return for fraudulent filing of information returns, usually have entertaining fact patterns.  They often revolve around business partners (sometimes family members) seeking retribution against one and other for perceived wrongdoing. One angry person will issue an information return indicating huge amounts of money were paid as compensation to the other angry person.  Often there is other litigation going on over a business divorce. This post involves Section 7434, but the fact pattern is unfortunately pretty boring, as is the primary holding.  The Court did, however, make an interesting statement (perhaps holding) that intentionally issuing an incorrect information return with correction information would not constitute the fraudulent filing of an information return.  No Circuit Courts have reviewed this issue, and it was a matter of first impression for the Central District of Illinois.

In Derolf v. Risinger Bros Transfer, Inc., two truck drivers brought suit under Section 7434 against their employer for issuing them Form 1099s for the compensation they received from the employer, Risinger Bros, believing they were employees and should have received Form W-2s instead.  There are like absolutely no interesting facts in the summary.  No Smoky and the Bandit hijinks, or lurid lot lizard tails (don’t ask).  The plaintiffs were long haul truckers, who entered into “operating agreements” and “leases” with the trucking company.  Those agreements provided significant flexibility in how the truckin was accomplished.  The primary holding of the case was that the truckers were, in fact, independent contractors, and the trucking company was correct in issuing Form 1099s to them for the work instead of Form W-2s.

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That pretty well nips the Section 7434 issue in the bud, as Risinger Bros acted properly, but the District Court for the Central District of Illinois still addressed the potential issuance of a fraudulent information return.  In general, under Section 7434, the person receiving an incorrect information return can bring a civil suit against the issuer if the issuer willfully files a fraudulent information return as to payments purported to be made to any other person.  This provides a remedy for someone who receives false information returns that the issuer was using commit tax fraud or to create issues for the person receiving the return.  This requires a showing of bad faith or deceit, which is often the main issue in these cases, and why you get all the juicy details.

The Court in Derolf stated no misclassification occurred, but that it found the claim that the wrong information return resulted in a fraudulent filed information return to be “not cognizable as pled.”  The Court noted that “there appears to be a split amongst the district courts, and no authoritative precedent as to whether the nature of the fraud pertains solely to the pecuniary value of the payments at issue or whether the scope of the fraud encompasses broader concepts.”  In the case, the plaintiff cited to two cases from the Southern District of Florida, and a case from Maryland  for the proposition that it was not solely the amount that had to be fraudulent.  The Court in Derolf dismissed those cases as failing to actually address the issue (sort of a weak split).  In one of those three, Leon v. Tapas & Tintos, Inc., the court did state that where a Form 1099 was issued instead of a proper W-2, “that the issued forms violated Section 7434 where Plaintiff could properly be classified as an employee rather than an independent contractor,” but did not spend any time discussing that issue.   The plaintiff in Leon failed to properly plead bad faith, so the matter was tossed without further discussion.

The Court in Derolf instead focused on two other district court cases, Liverett v. Torres Adv. Ent. Sols. LLC and Tran v. Tran, which both stated the fraud had to be due to a misstatement in the amount.  Liverett had a very similar fact pattern, and did a deep dive into the statutory language and the legislative history on the matter.  In Liverett, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found Section 7434 was ambiguous and it wasn’t clear if the fraud was on the payment amount or the information return itself, but based on statutory construction and legislative history that the fraud had to be on the amount.  I won’t go into great detail about the analysis, but I think aspects are open to other interpretations.  For instance, the Court relies on legislative history stating the rationale for enacting the statute as “some taxpayers may suffer significant personal loss and inconvenience as the result of the IRS receiving fraudulent information returns, which have been filed by persons intent on either defrauding the IRS or harassing taxpayers.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 35 (1996).  This doesn’t seem like a slam dunk in showing Section 7434 applies only to incorrect dollar amounts and not incorrect forms.  Perhaps the most convincing aspect of the holding was that the plaintiffs in these types of cases have other avenues of redress, specifically the Fair Labor Standards Act (although, in theory, this type of claim could arise with other forms not included under a FLSA claim, such as a Form 1099-Misc being issued when a Form 1099-B was appropriate).  Keith also mentioned this tactic seemed like potential self-help by the plaintiff in skirting the normal process for worker determination achieved by filing the SS-8.  This can be a slow process; taking many months.  It seems possible that the defendant or the Service could take the position that if the plaintiff has not sought such a determination, it has not exhausted its administrative remedies (then what happens if the plaintiff has, but the defendant still issues a Form 1099 when a W-2 would be appropriate –probably still no Section 7434 relief based on this case).

Overall, I think the statute and legislative history could be read to allow Section 7434 claims based on the filing of incorrect information returns, and not just incorrect dollar amounts on information returns.  For now, there is somewhat of a split, but most District Courts that have taken a hard look at this have come down on the side that the fraud must be in the amount reflected on the information return and not on the type of return filed.  Since 2015, there have been at least five or six cases looking at this issue, so I suspect more courts will deal with it in the coming months.

 

False Return Conviction Provides Basis for Collateral Estoppel to Prevent Discharge

For a brief period the Tax Court treated a conviction for filing a false return, IRC 7206(1) as the basis for sustaining the civil fraud penalty using collateral estoppel.  The period ran from the decision in Considine v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 52 (1977) to its reversal in Wright v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 636 (1985) (reviewed).  In the recent unpublished bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) case of Terrell v. IRS, BAP No. WO-16-007 (Bankr. 10th Feb 17,2017), the 10th Circuit BAP sustained the decision of the bankruptcy court and held that a guilty plea for filing a false return provides the basis for collaterally estopping the debtor from challenging the discharge of his taxes for the year of the plea.  Though unpublished, the opinion, without much analysis, pushes the scope of collateral estoppel on the issue of criminal conviction and civil fraud toward a more favorable position for the IRS.  Reasons exist for drawing a distinction between collateral estoppel in the bankruptcy discharge context and civil fraud penalty.  Had the court articulated those reasons, I would have come away from the opinion with a more comfortable feeling.

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The Tax Court opinions, cited above, determining first that collateral estoppel applies to civil fraud and then subsequently determining it does not provide lengthy analysis concerning the scope of a false return plea.  From the perspective of punishment both tax evasion, IRC 7201, and filing a false return will get the taxpayer to the same prison sentence almost every time.  Because the elements of the two crimes differ slightly and because proving the filing of a false return is slightly easier, prosecutors lean towards a false return conviction at times. Chief Counsel attorneys used to complain bitterly when Assistant United States Attorneys would accept a plea to a false return count rather than evasion because it meant a lot more work in the subsequent civil case; however, the change to 6201(a)(4) to allow assessment of the restitution amount may have taken some of the sting off of the situation.

The difference in the elements of the two crimes plays a role in deciding whether collateral estoppel applies.  The Tax Court examined this difference closely in its opinions applying the elements of the crimes to the civil fraud penalty while the BAP does not do spend as much time applying the elements of the crime to the elements of the applicable discharge statute.

In Considine the Tax Court reasoned:

(a) that it had previously held that a conviction for willfully attempting to avoid tax (I.R.C. § 7201) established fraudulent intent justifying a civil fraud penalty, see Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50, aff’d, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965); (b) that the Supreme Court had held that “willfully” has the same meaning in section 7206(1) (false return) as in section 7201 (attempt to evade tax), see United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973); and (c) therefore that a conviction for filing a false return, without more, establishes fraud justifying the civil penalty.

Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982)(the 9th Circuit criticizes the Tax Court’s decision in citing to Considine v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. at 59-61)

In reconsidering and reversing Considine, the Tax Court in Wright stated:

“In a criminal action under section 7206(1), the issue actually litigated and necessarily determined is whether the taxpayer voluntarily and intentionally violated his or her known legal duty not to make a false statement as to any material matter on a return. The purpose of section 7206(1) is to facilitate the carrying out of respondent’s proper functions by punishing those who intentionally falsify their Federal income tax, and the penalty for such perjury is imposed irrespective of the tax consequences of the falsification. As noted above, the intent to evade taxes is not an element of the crime charged under section 7206(1). Thus, the crime is complete with the knowing, material falsification, and a conviction under section 7206(1) does not establish as a matter of law that the taxpayer violated the legal duty with an intent, or in an attempt, to evade taxes.” (internal citations omitted)

The IRS Chief Counsel’s office at page 63 of its Tax Crimes Handbook states that “there is no collateral estoppel as to civil fraud penalties under this section. The section 7206 (1) charge is keyed into a false item, not a tax deficiency. Collateral estoppel arises only with a conviction or guilty plea to tax evasion.”  Similarly, IRM 25.1.6.4.3 provides that “A conviction under IRC 7206(1), filing a false return, does not collaterally estop the taxpayer from asserting a defense to the civil fraud penalty since conviction under IRC 7206(1) does not require proof of fraudulent intent to evade federal income taxes. In these cases, additional development is required to establish the taxpayer’s intent to evade assessment of a tax to be due and owing.”

At issue in Terrell is whether the his guilty plea for a false return places him squarely within the elements of 523(a)(1)(C).  Section 523 of the bankruptcy code sets out the actions with respect to individual debtors that prevent, or except, the discharge of a debt.  Congress has added to the list over the years since the adoption of the bankruptcy code in 1978.  The list of excepted debts in 523 numbers 19 and several of those 19 subparagraphs of section 523(a) have more than one basis for excepting the debt from discharge.

The provision relating to tax debts, 523(a)(1), has three separate bases for excepting a debt from discharge.  Subparagraph (A) excepts debts that achieve priority status under section 507(a)(8).  This subparagraph, in general terms, prevents debtors from discharging relatively new tax debts.  Subparagraph (B), which has been the subject of many posts, prevents debtors from discharging tax debts for which the debtor has never filed a return or filed a late return within two years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.  Subparagraph (C) at issue in this case prevents debtors from discharging tax debts “with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax.”

The question before the BAP concerns the language of the discharge exception for making a fraudulent return and the language of IRC 7206(1) for filing a false return.  Section 7206(1) holds a taxpayer liable for a felony tax offense if he “willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.”  Does this statute, which does not require any understatement of tax but merely a false statement, match the elements of bankruptcy code section 523(a)(1)(C) such that the conviction under IRC 7206(1) requires a finding of collateral estoppel regarding the discharge of the underlying taxes.

The BAP, after acknowledging that Mr. Terrell presented “no arguments as to why the bankruptcy court’s application of collateral estoppel was in error” says yes because (1) “the issue in the Criminal Case is identical to the issue presented in the Adversary Proceeding” because the same factual issues existed in both statutes; (2) his “guilty plea in the Criminal Case constitutes a full adjudication on the merits”; (3) both the debtor and the IRS were parties to the criminal case; and (4) the debtor “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Criminal Case.”

The language in 523(a)(1)(C) “made a fraudulent return” may sufficiently line up with the language of IRC 7206(1) to allow collateral estoppel to work here but I would like the court to work a little harder to make that connection for me.  The Tax Court eased into a similar conclusion with respect to the fraud penalty and an IRC 7206(1) conviction and then had to walk it back after the 9th Circuit brought its attention to the elements of that crime.  The standard of proof for the IRS in a 523(a)(1)(C) case is preponderance of evidence unlike the clear and convincing standard needed for sustaining the civil fraud penalty.  There are certainly differences between the Considine situation and the Terrell case but enough similarities to deserve more analysis.  I am not yet convinced.

Procedure Round Up(date):   Regulations, Mount Up! & State Law SOL Issue When Suing Promoters.

This will be a short post that touches on some temporary and final regulations that were issued in the last quarter of last year that impact tax procedure, specifically information reporting and the preparer due diligence rules, which we have previously covered.  The second portion of the post will deal with a state law statute of limitations issue from a tax shelter participant suing the promoter.

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Regulation Update

What is Keno?

Back in March of 2015, I wrote about the temporary regulations dealing with reporting of winnings from bingo, keno, and slot machines.  The Service has finalized those regulations, which can be found here.  I believe the final regulations are similar to the temporary regulations (although aspects regarding electronic slot machines were not included in the final regs). These rules peg the required reported winnings at $1,200 for bingo and slot machines (but $1,500 for keno).  Anyone have any idea why those amounts are different (or what keno is, I don’t go to casinos much)?  The information on the information reporting must include the name, address, and EIN of the payee, along with a description of the two types of ID used to verify the payee’s address.

Discharge Reporting- Buy Now, Three Years, No Payments!

I thought I had written up the proposed regulations from 2014 relating to the rules on discharge of indebtedness reporting when a borrower had not paid for more than three years, but I cannot find the post (very possible I just read about it and found it interesting).  Under Section 6050P, prior regulations treated nonpayment of debt for 36 months as an “identifiable event”, which indicated formal discharge of indebtedness and required the issuance of a Form 1099-C.  This caused many borrowers to believe the debt had been discharged, but it was simply an IRS reporting requirement.  Tax professionals, lenders and borrowers did not like the rule.  The final regulations can be found here.  The regulations eliminate the passage of that time frame as a reportable event, which is a good result.  This change may have come from discussions started in the ABA Tax Section, Low Income Taxpayer Committee.

Preparer Due Diligence Regs Updated.

The Government has issued temporary/proposed regulations regarding the preparer due diligence rules, which can be found here.  We’ve talked about preparer due diligence repeatedly on the blog, including one of our first posts (and most popular), where Les extensively discussed peeing in pools.  That was re-posted earlier this year, and can be found here.  In both 2014 and 2015, Section 6695 dealing with preparer due diligence was amended.  The penalty was indexed for inflation, and the due diligence requirements were expanded to include the Child Tax Credit, the Additional Child Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit.  The proposed regulations update the provisions to take into account these changes.

Information(less) Returns

In late December 2016, the Service issued guidance (Notice 2017-9) regarding the new de minimis safe harbor provisions enacted under the PATH act.  In general, failure to include all required information on an information return or payee statement will result in a penalty being imposed on the issuer.  The penalty is dependent on various factors, including the amount incorrectly reported, when it was not reported, how quickly it is rectified, and potentially other factors.

The penalty under Section 6721 can be reduced or eliminated in certain circumstances.  There is a de minimis exception to Section 6721, which allows the penalties to be waived if the error is corrected on or before August 1st in the year it is filed.  This is limited to the greater of ten returns or .5 percent of the information returns filed.  For returns required to be filed after December 31, 2016, there is a safe harbor that applies, where, if the information return has an error of $100 or less, or involves less than $25 of withholding, then the safe harbor applies, and no corrected return is required.  The notice is clear that this does not apply for intentional acts or intentional disregard.  It also indicates that regulations will be forthcoming regarding the safe harbor.

The de minimis safe harbor will not apply, however, if the payee elects out of the safe harbor.  Under Section 6721(c)(3)(B) and Section 6722(c)(3)(B), the payee can make an election and the payor has thirty days to furnish a corrected payee statement to the payee and the IRS.  If it is not done within thirty days the penalties will apply (it is possible for additional time in limited circumstances).

The payor must provide the manner for making such an election, which can be any reasonable manner including by writing, electronically or by telephone.  The payee must be told in writing the fashion in which the election can be made.  The notice goes on to indicate the timing of when the election must be made, and indicates the election must: 1) clearly state the election is being made; 2) the payee’s name, address, and TIN; 3) the type of statements and account numbers; and 4) the years in which the election should apply.

So, if you are super angry that Gigantor Bank and Lack of Trust Company misstated your 1099 by $4.37, you now have your avenue for redress.

Shelter Participant SOL Against Promotor Runs From Final Tax Court Ruling, Not Notice of Tax Deficiency

I initially saw this suit, and thought some aspect pertained to federal law claims against the tax shelter promoter, but the claims were state law based.  It is, however, still an interesting statute of limitations issue, that could impact future rulings based on state law.

In Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG, the Eleventh Circuit, following direction from the Florida Supreme Court, has reversed the district court in holding the statute of limitation on state based claims against a tax shelter promoter by a participant were not time barred.

The particular holding is for a relatively straightforward issue.  After the defendant admitted fault, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to the plaintiff for his involvement in the shelter.  This occurred in October of 2007.  On November 1, 2012, there was a final tax court order disposing of the case (90 days thereafter appeal rights expired).  On November 4, 2013, plaintiff filed suit against the defendant alleging various state law claims including fraud from the promoting and selling of the transaction.

The defendants moved to have the case thrown out as being outside of Florida’s four and five year statute of limitations for the claims made.  The issue was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which sought guidance from the Florida Supreme Court on the issue, specifically:

Under Florida law and the facts in this case, do the claims of the plaintiff taxpayers relating to the CARDS tax shelter accrue at the time the IRS issues a notice of deficiency or when the taxpayer’s underlying dispute with the IRS is concluded or final.

The Florida Supreme Court, which the Eleventh Circuit followed, determined that the claims accrued at the time the tax court order became final, which was ninety days after the order was issued when the appeals period had passed. See Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG 202 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 2016).  I think this is inline generally with what the federal law would be in most analogous situations, but would invite others to comment on this aspect if they have thoughts.

Procedure Grab Bag: CCAs – Suspended/Extended SOLs and Fraud Penalty

My last post was devoted to a CCA, which inspired me to pull a handful of other CCAs to highlight from the last few months.  The first CCA discusses the suspension of the SOL when a petition is filed with the Tax Court before a deficiency notice is issued (apparently, the IRM is wrong on this point in at least one spot).  The second touches on whether failing to disclose prior years gifts on a current gift tax return extends the statute of limitations for assessment on a gift tax return that was timely filed (this is pretty interesting because you cannot calculate the tax due without that information).  And, finally, a CCA on the imposition of the fraud penalty in various filing situations involving amended returns.

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CCA 201644020 – Suspension of SOL with Tax Court petition when no deficiency notice

We routinely call the statutory notice of deficiency the ticket to the Tax Court.  In general, when a taxpayer punches that ticket and heads for black robe review, the statute of limitations on assessment and collections is tolled during the pendency of the Tax Court case.  See Section 6503(a).  What happens when the petition is filed too soon, and the Court lacks jurisdiction?  Well, the IRM states that the SOL is not suspended.  IRM 8.20.7.21.2(4) states, “If the petition filed by the taxpayer is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Service did not issue a SND, the ASED is not suspended and the case must be returned to the originating function…”  But, Chief Counsel disagrees. Section 6503(a) states:

The running of the period of limitations provided in section 6501 or 6502…shall (after the mailing of a notice under section 6212(a)) be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from making the assessment or from collecting by the levy or a proceeding in court (and in any event, if a proceeding in respect of the deficiency is placed on the docket of the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final), and for 60 days thereafter. (emph. added).

Chief Counsel believes the second parenthetical above extends the limitations period even when the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction because no notice of deficiency was issued.   The CCA further states, “Any indication in the IRM that the suspension does not apply if the Service did not mail a SND is incorrect.”  Time for an amendment to the IRM.  I think this is the correct result, but the Service likely had some reason for its position in the IRM, and might be worth reviewing if you are in a situation with the SOL might have run.

CCA 201643020

The issue in CCA 201643020 was whether the three year assessment period was extended due to improper disclosure…of prior gifts properly reported on prior returns.  In general, taxpayers making gifts must file a federal gift tax return, Form 709, by April 15th the year following the gift.  The Service, under Section 6501(a) has three years to assess tax after a proper return is filed.  If no return is filed, or there is not proper notification, the service may assess at any time under Section 6501(c)(9).

In the CCA, the Service sought guidance on whether a the statute of limitations was extended where in Year 31 a gift was made and reported on a timely filed gift tax return.  In previous years 1, years 6 through 9, and 15 prior gifts were reported on returns.  On the year 31 return, however, those prior gifts were not reported.  That information was necessary to calculate the correct amount of tax due.

Section 6501(c)(9) specifically states:

If any gift of property the value of which … is required to be shown on a return of tax imposed by chapter 12 (without regard to section 2503(b)), and is not shown on such return, any tax imposed by chapter 12 on such gift may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any item which is disclosed in such return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature of such item.

Chief Counsel concluded that this requires a two step analysis.  Step one is if the gift was reported on the return.  If not, step two requires a determination if the item was adequately disclosed.  Counsel indicated it is arguable that the regulations were silent on the omission of prior gifts, but that the statutory language was clear.  Here, the gift was disclosed on the return, and the statutory requirements were met.  The period was not extended.  I was surprised there was not some type of Beard discussion regarding providing sufficient information to properly calculate the tax due.

CCA 201640016

Earlier this year, the Service also released CCA 201640016, which is Chief Counsel Advice covering the treatment of fraud penalties in various circumstances surrounding taxpayers filing returns and amended returns with invalid original issue discount claims.  The conclusions are not surprising, but it is a good summary of how the fraud penalties can apply.

The taxpayer participated in an “Original Issue Discount (OID) scheme” for multiple tax years.  The position take for the tax years was frivolous.  For tax year 1, the Service processed the return and issued a refund.  For tax year 2, the Service did not process the return or issue a refund. For tax year 3, the return was processed but the refund frozen.  The taxpayer would not cooperate with the Service’s criminal investigation, and was indicted and found guilty of various criminal charges.  Spouse of taxpayer at some point filed amended returns seeking even greater refunds based on the OID scheme, but those were also frozen (the dates are not included, but the story in my mind is that spouse brazenly did this after the conviction).

The issues in the CCA were:

  1. Are the original returns valid returns?
  2. If valid, is the underpayment subject to the Section 6663 fraud penalty?
  3. Did the amended returns result in underpayments such that the penalty could apply, even though the Service did not pay the refunds claimed?

The conclusions were:

  1. It is likely a court would consider the returns valid, even with the frivolous position, but, as an alternative position, any notice issued by the Service should also treat the returns as invalid and determine the fraudulent failure to file penalty under Section 6651(f).
  2. To the extent the return is valid, the return for which a refund was issued will give rise to an underpayment potentially subject to the fraud penalty under Section 6663. The non-processed returns or the ones with frozen refunds will not give rise to underpayments and Section 6663 iis inapplicable.  CC recommended the assertion of the Section 6676 penalty for erroneous claims for refund or credit.
  3. The amended returns did not result in underpayments, so the Section 6663 fraud penalty is inapplicable, but, again, the Service could impose the Section 6676 penalty.

So, the takeaway, if a taxpayer fails to file a valid return, or there is no “underpayment” on a fraudulent return, the Service cannot use Section 6663.  See Mohamed v. Comm’r, TC Memo. 2013-255 (where no valid return filed, no fraud penalty can be imposed).  In the CCA, Counsel believed the return was valid, but acknowledged potential issues with that position.  Under the Beard test, a return is valid if:

 four requirements are met: (1) it must contain sufficient data to calculate tax liability; (2) it must purport to be a return; (3) it must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and (4) it must be executed by the taxpayer under penalties of perjury. See Beard v. Comm’r,  82 T.C. 766 (1984). A return that is incorrect, or even fraudulent, may still be a valid return if “on its face [it] plausibly purports to be in compliance.” Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386 (1984).

The only prong the CCA said was at issue was the third prong, that the return “must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.”  As the taxpayer had been convicted of Filing False Claims with a Government Agency/Filing A False Income Tax Return, Aiding and Abetting, and Willful Attempt to Evade or Defeat the Payment of Tax, it is understandable why you would question if the returns were “an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.”  Further, the Service had imposed the frivolous filing penalty under Section 6702, which only applies when the return information “on its face indicates that the self-assessment is substantially incorrect.”

The CCA notes, however, it is rare for courts to hold returns as invalid solely based on the third prong of Beard, but clearly there would be a valid argument for the taxpayers in this situation.  The CCA acknowledges that by stating “[t]o guard against the possibility that the returns are not valid, the Service should include the Section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file penalty as an alternative position,” so the taxpayer could pick his poison.

As to the underpayment, Counsel highlighted that overstatements of withholding credits can give rise to an underpayment under the fraud penalty.  The definition was shown as a formula of Underpayment = W-(X+Y-Z).  W is the amount of tax due, X is the amount shown as due on the return, Y is amounts not shown but previously assessed, and Z is the amount of rebates made.  Where the refund was provided, the penalty could clearly apply.  In “frozen refund” situations, the Service has adopted the practice of treating that amount as a sum collected without assessment, which can cancel out the X and Y variables so no underpayment for the fraud penalty will exist.

But, as shown above, even if the fraud penalty may not apply, the Section 6651 penalty will likely apply if the return is invalid, or the frivolous position penalty under Section 6702 may apply.

Summary Opinions for End of December 2015

Happy Presidents’ Day!  While some of you are at home celebrating the lives of Martin Van Buren, Chester Arthur, Tippecanoe and Tyler too, PT is still hard at work churning out tax procedure commentary.  In this SumOp, we cover a few remaining items from December that we didn’t otherwise cover (in detail).  Post includes more of Athletes, the IRS, and rich people behaving badly.  It also has a link to Frank Agostino’s January newsletter, which has a bankruptcy/OIC discussion that is really strong.

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  • The IRS has mud on its face again for wiping another hard drive, this time potentially destroying documents related to the IRS hiring of Quinn Emanuel.  Robert Woods at Forbes has coverage here.
  • Those of you who love the beautiful game should be excited Sepp’s on his way out, but worried that Mascherano’s stout defense won’t extend to his tax fraud conviction.  That’s three Barca players with tax troubles, including Messi and Neymar.  Barca should call me immediately, and bring me in house to review all their players’ finances (and/or play midfield).  Marketwatch has an article, found here, on why so many professional athletes get in tax trouble (recap:  their tax returns are more complicated than your tax return, they are super rich and young, and they often have issues handling their finances).
  • Agostino and Associates have issued their January tax controversy newsletter found here.  The bankruptcy/OIC discussion and which option to use is a great summary of something many of us probably grapple with on a weekly or even daily basis.
  • This is more substantive than procedural, but interesting.  Sometimes cases have the best names based on the underlying dispute.  Loving vs. Virginia is probably the best known.  Green v. US, a recent District Court case out of Oklahoma also fits the bill.  The case involves a bunch of green, in the form of a real estate charitable contributions (Hobby Lobby $$$ and land).  In Green, prior to the case, Chief Counsel had stated that a non-grantor trust could not deduct the full fair market value of appreciated property donated to a charity under Section 642(c)(1).  That section allows for a deduction, without limitation, for property passed to qualifying charities.  The CCA looks to various cases which indicated (tangentially) that the deduction was limited to the adjusted basis.  The District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma held that Section 642(c)(1) had no specific limitation on the deduction amount and the full FMV was allowed.
  • Morales v. Comm’r was decided by the Ninth Circuit in December.  Prior to the opinion, Carlton Smith has covered this case in detail for us, including this post in July, and he cited to it last week in discussing the 6676 penalty.   At issue in Morales was a Rand type case, where penalties were imposed on an “underpayment” created by a taxpayer improperly claiming and receiving the first time homebuyer credit. The question raised was whether a taxpayer must assign errors to each and every alleged error or whether pleadings are sufficient with only a general denial of liability. The Ninth Circuit in an unpublished opinion held that the Tax Court had properly denied the reconsideration of the penalty as the taxpayer had not specifically raised the argument that the credit did not give rise to an underpayment.
  • Before making flippant remarks about this case, I hope the US Attorney involved has obtained proper treatment for the mental illness.  Beyond the wellbeing of that individual, I do not feel terribly bad for the IRS in In Re: Murphy.  In February of 2015, the Assistant District Court found that the IRS violation of a preliminary injunction on collection actions could not be ignored due to the fact that the US Attorney was suffering from substantial mental health issues, including dementia.  In December, the Bankruptcy Court (sorry, no link) concluded it would not review the matter again, and the IRS was responsible for claims under Section 7433, even if the Service likely would have been successful in the case had the US Attorney been competent.  As we’ve seen many cases where taxpayer’s representatives have suffered from illness, but the IRS has still imposed substantial penalties, I’m not heartbroken to see the issue go the other way.
  • Way back in July of 2014, SumOp covered the tax problems of the Hit Dog, Mo Vaughn, where the Tax Court held he lacked reasonable cause for failing to file his tax returns and pay the tax due.  Mo took a swing and a miss with the Sixth Circuit also, which agreed with the Tax Court.  The Court held that simply hiring an attorney, financial advisor and accountant was not sufficient to show reasonable cause, and the fraud and embezzlement of those folks did not constitute disability.
  • Sumner Redstone did not have the best December and early January.  He probably lost a boatload in the stock market, and he was directed to undergo a mental exam to determine if he is incapacitated (his ex-ladyfriend is making this accusation – lover scorned!).  He was also found liable for gift tax from 1972!!!!!!.  Jack Townsend had coverage on his Federal Tax Crimes Blog here. Tax was around $740k.  The interest has to be pretty darn high.  There was one bit of good news, which was that no penalties were imposed.  As Jack notes, this is the interesting aspect of the case.  Underlying question involved the valuation of a closely held business interest, which was based on redemption price on intra-family sale.

Summary Opinions through 12/18/15

Sorry for the technical difficulties over the last few days.   We are glad to be back up and running, and hopefully won’t have any other hosting issues in the near future.

December had a lot of really interesting tax procedure items, many of which we covered during the month, including the PATH bill.  Below is the first part of a two part Summary Opinions for December.  Included below are a recent case dealing with Section 6751(b)(1) written approval of penalties, a PLR dealing with increasing carryforward credits from closed years , an update on estate tax closing letters, reasonable cause with foundation taxes, an update on the required record doctrine, and various other interesting tax items.

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  • In December, PLR 201548006 was issued regarding whether an understated business credit for a closed year could be carried forward with the correct increased amounts for an open year.  The taxpayer was a partner in a partnership and shareholder in an s-corp.  The conclusion was that the corrected credit could be carried forward based on Mennuto v. Comm’r, 56 TC 910, which had allowed the Service to recalculate credits for a closed year to ascertain the correct tax in the open year.
  • IRS has issued web guidance regarding closing letters for estate tax returns, which can be found here.  This follows the IRS indicating that closing letters will only be issued upon taxpayer request (and then every taxpayer requesting a closing letter).  My understanding from other practitioners is that the transcript request in this situation has not worked well.  And, some states will not accept this as proof the Service is done with its audit.  Many also feel it is not sufficient to direct an executor to make distributions.  Seems as those most are planning on just requesting the letters.
  • Models and moms behaving badly (allegedly).  Bar Refaeli and her mother have been arrested for tax fraud in Israel.  The Israeli taxing authority claims that Bar told her accountant that she resided outside of Israel, while she was living in homes within the country under the names of relatives.  Not model behavior.
  • The best JT (sorry Mr. Timberlake and Jason T.), Jack Townsend, has a post on his Federal Tax Procedure Blog on the recent Brinkley v. Comm’r case out of the Fifth Circuit, which discusses the shift of the burden of proof under Section 7491.
  • PMTA 2015-019 was released providing the government’s position on two identity theft situations relating to validity of returns, and then sharing the return information to the victims.  The issues were:

1. Whether the Service can treat a filed Business Masterfile return as a nullity when the return is filed using a stolen EIN without the knowledge of the EIN’s owner.

2. Whether the Service can treat a filed BMF return as a nullity when the EIN used on the return was obtained by identifying the party with a stolen name and SSN…

4. Whether the Service may disclose information about a potentially fraudulent business or filing to the business that purportedly made the filing or to the individual who signed the return or is identified as the “responsible party” when the Service suspects the “responsible party” or business has no knowledge of the filing.

And the conclusions were:

1. The Service may treat a filed BMF return as a nullity when a return is filed using a stolen EIN without the permission or knowledge of the EIN’s owner because the return is not a valid return.

2. The Service may treat a filed BMF return as a nullity when the EJN used on the return was obtained by using a stolen name for Social Security Number for the business’s responsible person. The return is not a valid return.

  • Back in 2014, SCOTUS decided Clark v. Rameker, which held that inherited IRAs were not retirement accounts under the bankruptcy code, and therefore not exempt from creditors.  In Clark, the petitioners made the claim for exemption under Section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code for the inherited retirement account, and not the state statute (WI, where petitioner resided, allowed the debtor to select either the federal exemptions or the state exemptions).  End of story for those using federal exemptions, but some states allow selection like WI between state or federal exemptions, while others have completely opted out of the federal exemptions, such as Montana.  A recent Montana case somewhat follows Clark, but based on the different Montana statute.  In In Re: Golz, the Bankruptcy Court determined that a chapter 7 debtor’s inherited IRA was not exempt from creditors.  The Montana law states:

individual retirement accounts, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 408(a), to the extent of deductible contributions made before the suit resulting in judgment was filed and the earnings on those contributions, and Roth individual retirement accounts, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 408A, to the extent of qualified contributions made before the suit resulting in judgment was filed and the earnings on those contributions.

The BR Court, relying on a November decision of the MT Supreme Court, held that an inherited IRA did not qualify based on the definition under the referenced Code section of retirement account.  I believe opt-out states cannot restrict exemption of retirement accounts beyond what is found under Section 522, but it might be possible to expand the exemption (speculation on my part).   Here, the MT statute did not broaden the definition to include inherited IRAs.

  • In August, we covered US v. Chabot, where the 3rd Circuit agreed with all other circuits in holding the required records doctrine compels bank records to be provided over Fifth Amendment challenges.  SCOTUS has declined to review the Circuit Court decision.
  • PLR 201547007 is uncool (technical legal term).   The PLR includes a TAM, which concludes reasonable cause holdings for abatement of penalties are not precedent (and perhaps not persuasive) for abating the taxable expenditure tax on private foundations under Section 4945(a)(1).  The foundation in question had assistance from lawyers and accountants in all filing and administrative requirements, and those professionals knew all relevant facts and circumstances.  The foundation apparently failed to enter into a required written agreement with a donee, and may not have “exercised expenditures responsibly” with respect to the donee.  This caused a 5% tax to be imposed, which was paid, and a request for abatement due to reasonable cause was filed.  Arguments pointing to abatement of penalties (such as Section 6651 and 6656) for reasonable cause were made.  The Service did not find this persuasive, and makes a statutory argument against allowing reasonable cause which I did not find compelling.  The TAM indicates that the penalty sections state the penalty is imposed “unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.”  That language is also found regarding Section 4945(a)(2), but not (1), the first tier tax on the foundation.  That same language is found, however, under Section 4962(a), which allows for abatement if the event was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, and such event was corrected within a reasonable period.  Service felt that Congress did not intend abatement to apply to (a)(1), or intended a different standard to apply, because reasonable cause language was included only in (a)(2).  I would note, however, that Section 4962 applies broadly to all first tier taxes, but does specify certain taxes that it does not apply to.  Congress clearly selected certain taxes for the section not to apply, and very easily could have included (a)(1) had it intended to do so.

I’m probably devoting too much time to this PLR/TAM, but it piqued my interest. The Service also stated that the trust cannot rely on the lack of advice to perform certain acts as advice that such acts are not necessary.  I am not sure how the taxpayer would know he or she was not receiving advice if it asked the professionals to ensure all distributions were proper and all filings handled.  I can hear the responses (perhaps from Keith) that this is a difficult question, and perhaps the lawyer or accountant should be responsible.  I understand, but have a hard time getting behind the notion that a taxpayer must sue someone over missed paperwork when the system is so convoluted.  Whew, I was blowing so hard, I almost fell off my soapbox.

  • This is more B.S. than the tax shelters Jack T. is always writing about.  TaxGirl has created her list of 100 top tax twitter accounts you must follow, which can be found here. Lots of great accounts that we follow from writers we love, but PT was not listed (hence the B.S.).  It stings twice as much, as we all live within 20 miles of TaxGirl, and we sometimes contribute to Forbes, where she is now a full time writer/editor.  Thankfully, Prof. Andy Gerwal appears to be starting a twitter war against TaxGirl (or against CPAs because Kelly included so many CPAs and so few tax professors).  We have to throw our considerable backing and resources behind Andy, in what we assume will be a brutal, rude, explicit, scorched earth march to twitter supremacy.  We are excited about our first twitter feud, even if @TaxGirl doesn’t realize we are in one.
  • This doesn’t directly relate to tax procedure or policy, but it could be viewed as impacting it, and we reserved the right to write about whatever we want.  Here is a blog post on the NYT Upshot blog on how we perceive the economy, how we delude ourselves to reinforce our political allegiances (sort of like confirmation bias), and how money can change that all.

Summary Opinions for November

1973_GMC_MotorhomeHere is a summary of some of the other tax procedure items we didn’t otherwise cover in November.  This is heavy on tax procedure intersecting with doctors (including one using his RV to assist his practice).  Also, important updates on the AICPA case, US v. Rozbruch, and the DOJ focusing on employment withholding issues.

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I’ve got a bunch of Jack Townsend love to start SumOp.  He covered a bunch of great tax procedure items last month.  No reason for me to do an inferior write up, when I can just link him.  First is his coverage of the Dr. Bradner conviction for wire fraud and tax evasion found on Jack’s Federal Tax Crime’s blog.  Why is this case interesting?  Because it seems like this Doc turned his divorce into some serious tax crimes, hiding millions offshore.  He then tried to bring the money back to the US, but someone in the offshore jurisdiction had flipped on him, and Homeland Security seized the funds ($4.6MM – I should have become a plastic surgeon!).  His ex is probably ecstatic that the Feds were able to track down some marital assets.   I am sure that will help keep her in the standard of living she has become accustom to.

  • I know I’ve said this before, but you should really follow Jack Townsend’s blogs.  From his Federal Tax Procedure Blog, a write up of the Second Circuit affirming the district court in United States v. Rozbruch.  Frank Agostino previously wrote up the district court case for us with his associates Brian Burton and Lawrence Sannicandro.  That post, entitled, Procedural Challenges to Penalties: Section 6751(b)(1)’s Signed Supervisory Approval Requirement can be found here.  Those gents are pretty knowledgeable about this topic, as they are the lawyers for the taxpayer. As Jack explains, the Second Circuit introduces a new phrase, “functional satisfaction” (sort of like substantial compliance) as a way to find for the IRS in a case considering the application of Section 6751(b) to the trust fund recovery penalty.
  • The Tax Court in Trumbly v. Comm’r  has held that sanctions could not be imposed against the Service under Section 6673(a)(2) where the settlement officer incorrectly declared the administrative record consisted of 88 exhibits that were supposed to be attached to the declaration but were not actually attached.  The Chief Counsel lawyer failed to realize the issue, and forwarded other documents, claiming it was the record.  The Court held that the Chief Counsel lawyer failed to review the documents closely, and did not intentionally forward incorrect documents.  The Court did not believe the actions raised to the level of bad faith (majority position), recklessness or another lesser degree of culpability (minority position).  Not a bad result from failing to review your file!
  • This isn’t that procedure related, but I found the case interesting, and I’ve renamed the Tax Court case Cartwright v. Comm’r as “Breaking Bones”.  Dr. Cartwright, a surgeon, used a mobile home as his “mobile office” parked in the hospital parking lot.  He didn’t treat people in his mobile home (which is good, because that could seem somewhat creepy), but he did paperwork and research while in the RV.  Cartwright attempted to deduct expenses related to the RV, including depreciation.  The Court found that the deductions were allowable, but only up to the percentages calculated by the Service for business use verse personal use.  I’m definitely buying an Airstream and taking Procedurally Taxing on the road (after we find a way to monetize this).
  • The IRS thinks you should pick your tax return preparer carefully (because it and Congress have created a monstrosity of Code and Regs, and it is pretty easy for preparers to steal from you).
  • Les wrote about AICPA defending CPA turf in September.  In the post, he discussed the actions the AICPA has been taking, including the oral argument in its case challenging the voluntary education and testing regime.  As Les stated:

The issue on appeal revolves whether the AICPA has standing to challenge the plan in court rather than the merits of the suit. The panel and AICPA’s focus was on so-called competitive standing, which essentially gives a hook for litigants to challenge an action in court if the litigant can show an imminent or actual increase in competition as a result of the regulation.

On October 30th, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the lower court, and held that the AICPA had standing to challenge the IRS’s Annual Filing Season Program, where the IRS created a voluntary program to somewhat regulate unenrolled return preparers.  The Court found the AICPA had “competitive standing”, which Les highlighted in his post as the argument the Court seemed to latch on to.   For more info on this topic, those of you with Tax Notes subscriptions can look to the November 2nd article, “AICPA Has Standing to Challenge IRS Return Preparer Program”.  Les was quoted in the post, discussing the underlying reasons for the challenge.

  • Service issued CCA 201545017 which deals with a fairly technical timely (e)mailing is timely (e)filing issue with an amended return for a corporation that was rejected from electronic filing and the corporation subsequently paper filed.  The corporation was required to efile the amended return pursuant to Treas. Reg. 301.6011-5(d)(4). Notice 2010-13 outlines the procedure for what should occur if a return is rejected for efiling to ensure timely mailing/timely filing, and requires contacting the Service, obtaining assistance, and then eventually obtaining a waiver from efiling.  There is a ten day window for this to occur.  The corporation may have skipped some of the required steps and just paper filed.  The Service found this was timely filing, and skipping the steps in the notice was not fatal.  The Service did note, however, that efiling for the year in question was no longer available, so the intermediate steps were futile.  A paper return would have been required.  It isn’t clear if the Service would have come to the same conclusion if efiling was possible.
  • Sticking with CCAs, in November the IRS also released CCA 201545016 dealing with when the IRS could reassess abated assessment on a valid return where the taxpayer later pled guilty to filing false claims.   The CCA is long, and has a fairly in depth tax pattern discussed, covering whether various returns were valid (some were not because the jurat was crossed out), and whether income was excessive when potentially overstated, and therefore abatable.  For the valid returns, where income was overstated, the Service could abate under Section 6404, but the CCA warned that the Service could not reassess unless the limitations period was still open, so abatement should be carefully considered.

 

 

Summary Opinions for 9/21/15 to 10/2/15

Running a little behind on the Summary Opinions.  Should hopefully be caught up through most of October by the end of this week.  Some very good FOIA, whistleblower, and private collections content in this post.  Plus fantasy football tax cheats, business on boats, and lots of banks getting sued.  Here are the items from the end of September that we didn’t otherwise write about:

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  • Let’s start with some FOIA litigation. The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two opinions relating to Cause of Action, which holds itself out as an advocate for government accountability.  On August 28th, the Court ruled regarding a FOIA request by Cause for various documents relating to Section 6103(g) requests, which would include all request by the executive office of the Prez for return information, plus all such requests by that office that were not related to Section 6103(g), and all requests for disclosure by an agency of return information pursuant to Sections 6103(i)(1), (2), & (3)(A).   The IRS failed to release any information pursuant to the last two requests, taking the position that records discussing return information would be “return information” themselves, and therefore should be withheld under FOIA exemption 3.  There are various holdings in this case, but the one I found most interesting was the determination that the request by the Executive Branch and the IRS responses may not be “return information” per se, which would require a review by the IRS of the applicable documents.  Although the petition was drafted in broad terms, this Washington Times article indicates the plaintiff was seeking records regarding the Executive Branch looking into them specifically, presumably as some type of retaliation.

In a second opinion issued on September 16th, in Cause of Action v. TIGTA, Judge Jackson granted TIGTA’s motion for summary judgement because after litigation and in camera review, the Court determined none of the found documents were responsive.  This holding was related to the same case as above, but the IRS had shifted a portion of the FOIA request to TIGTA.  Initially, TIGTA issued a Glomar response, indicating it could not confirm or deny the existence (I assume for privacy reasons, not national defense).  The Court found that was inapplicable, and TIGTA was forced to do a review and found 2,500 records, which it still withheld.  Cause of Action tried to force disclosure, but the Court did an in camera review and found the responsive records were not actually applicable.

  • That was complicated.  Now for something completely different.  This HR Block infographic is trying to get you all investigated for tax fraud.  In summary, 75 million of the 319 million people in America play fantasy football, and roughly none are paying taxes on their winnings.  If you click on the infographic, we know you are guilty.  Thankfully, my teams this year are abysmal, so I won’t be committing tax fraud…my wife on the other hand has a juggernaut in our shared league…To all of our IRS readers, please ignore this post.
  • Now a couple whistleblower cases.  In Whistleblower One 10683W v. Comm’r, the Tax Court held that the whistleblower was entitled to review relevant information relating to the denial of the award based on information provided by the whistleblower.  The whistleblower had requested information relating to the investigation of the target, the disclosed sham transaction, and the amounts collected, but the IRS took the position that certain items requested were not in the Whistleblower Office’s file, and were, therefore, beyond the scope of discovery (denied, but we don’t have to explain ourselves).  The Court disagreed and found the information was relevant and subject to review by the whistleblower.  Further, the IRS was not unilaterally allowed to decide what was part of the administrative record.  Another case that perhaps casts a negative light on how the IRS is handling the whistleblower program.
  • On September 21st, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida declined a pro se’s request for reconsideration of a petition for injunctive relief against the IRS to force it to investigate his whistleblower claim in Meidinger v. Comm’r (sorry couldn’t find a free link to this order).  Mr. Meidinger likely knew the court lacked jurisdiction, and this was the purview of the tax court —  Here is a write up by fellow blogger, Lew Taishoff, on Mr. Meidinger’s failed tax court case.  Lew’s point back in 2013 on the case still rings true:  “But the administrative agency here has its own check and balances, provided by the Legislative branch.  There’s TIGTA, whose mission is ‘(T)o provide integrated audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services that promote economy, efficiency, and integrity in the administration of the internal revenue laws.’ Might could be y’all should take a look at how the Whistleblower Office is doing.”  The tax court really can’t force an investigation, but TIGTA could put some pressure on the WO to do so.  After taking a shot at the IRS, I should note I know nothing of the facts in this case, and Mr. Meidinger may have no right to an award, and TIGTA has flagged various issues in the program.  It just doesn’t feel like significant progress is being made.
  • I found Strugala v. Flagstar Bank  pretty interesting, which dealt with a taxpayer trying to bring a private action under Section 6050H.  Plaintiff Lisa Strugala filed a class action suit against Flagstar Bank for its practice of reporting, and then in future years ceasing to report, capitalized interest on the borrower’s Form 1098s.  Flagstar Bank apparently had a loan that allowed borrowers to pay less than all the interest due each month, resulting in interest being added to the principal amount due.  At year end, the bank would issue a 1098 showing the interest paid and the interest deferred.  In 2011, the bank ceased putting the deferred interest on the form.  Plaintiff claims that the bank’s practice violated Section 6050H, which only requires interest paid to be included.  The over-reporting of interest, she claims, causes tens of thousands of tax returns to be filed incorrectly.  Further, upon the sale of her home, Strugala believed that the bank received accrued interest income that it didn’t report to her.  A portion of the case was dismissed, but the remainder was transferred to the IRS under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  The Court found the IRS had not stated how the borrower should report interest in this particular situation, and that it should determine whether or not this was a violation.  In addition, Section 6050H didn’t have a private right under the statute.  I was surprised that this was not a case of first impression.  The Court references another action from a few years ago with identical facts.  However, perhaps I shouldn’t not have been, as this is somewhat similar to the BoA case Les wrote about last year, where taxpayers sued Bank of America alleging fraudulent 1098s had been issued relating to restructuring of mortgage loans.
  • The Tax Court has held in Estate of John DiMarco v. Comm’r, that an estate was not entitled to a charitable deduction where individual beneficiaries were challenging the disposition of assets.  Under the statute, the funds have to be set aside solely for charity, and the chance of it benefiting an individual have to be  “so remote as to be negligible.”  Here, the litigation made it impossible to make that claim.
  • My firm has a fairly large maritime practice, which makes sense given our sizable port in West Chester, PA (there is not actually a port, but we do a ton of maritime work).  That made me excited about this crossover tax procedure and maritime  Chief Counsel Advice dealing with Section 1359(a).  Most of our readers probably do not run across Section 1359 too frequently.  Section 1359 provides non-recognition treatment for the sale of a qualifying vessel, similar to what Section 1031 does for like kind real estate transactions.  This applies for entities that have elected the tonnage tax regime under Section 1352, as opposed to the normal income tax regime.  In general, the replacement vessel can be purchased one year before the disposition or three years afterwards.  But, (b)(2) states, “or subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Secretary, on such later date as the Secretary may designate on application by the taxpayer.  Such application shall be made at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.”  Those regulations do not exist.  The CCA determined that even though the regulations do not exist, the IRS must consider a request for an extension of time to purchase a replacement vessel, as the Regs are clearly supposed to deal with extensions by request.
  • From The Hill, another article against the IRS use of private collection agencies.