Designated Orders: 2/5 – 2/9/2018

0 Flares 0 Flares ×

Patrick Thomas who teaches and runs the tax clinic at Notre Dame brings us this week’s designated order posts. Graev continues to draw the Court’s attention. I found the post on what happens to material attached to the petition to be of special interest. Keith 

Last week’s designated orders continue to discuss the Pandora’s Box of issues that the Court unleashed in its Graev III opinion. Judge Ashford granted an IRS motion to reopen the record to demonstrate compliance with section 6751(b); Judge Gustafson did the same, though gave petitioner an opportunity to respond regarding the approval form’s authenticity; and Judge Holmes issued an interesting order, which we discuss more fully below.

In other orders, Judge Buch issued a bench opinion disallowing various unsubstantiated itemized deductions; Judge Armen issued an order fully disposing of a case, which educated a taxpayer on the basics of federal income taxation; Judge Gustafson issued a bench opinion in a CDP case, where the petitioner did not submit a Form 433-A; and Judge Jacobs issued two miscellaneous orders.


Docket No. 18254-17L, Kestin v. C.I.R. (Order Here)

This order merits only a quick discussion, but one that my students may find useful as they complete their Tax Court petition assignment. The petitioner here submitted a number of evidentiary documents along with their Tax Court petition. Many pro se taxpayers (and even some inexperienced practitioners) may do this, reasonably believing that documentation would support the claims made in the petition.

However, the Tax Court may only consider documentation if formally entered into evidence. As such, the Court’s clerk wrote the petitioner, informing her as much. The petitioner responded with a “motion to amend”, asking the clerk not to reject her documents (and to fix a weblink error she noticed).

Judge Gustafson denied the motion as moot, seeing no need to amend any claim in the petition. He noted further that the petitioner could cite the correct web address later in her pretrial memo, and can attempt to submit evidence at trial. Finally, Judge Gustafson notes that the documentation she submitted was not actually deleted from the petition; indeed, it’s very likely still available in hard copy in the case file in DC, or in electronic format via the petitioner’s Tax Court website login. Not an earthshattering order, but important for clearing up this basic proposition for newer practitioners and pro se taxpayers alike. 

Docket No. 174980-17L, Holdner v. C.I.R. (Order Here)

In Holdner, the taxpayer continued a nearly 15-year fixation with the tax years 2004 through 2006—even though this case related to a CDP hearing from a levy and lien filing related to 2015.

The earlier years were litigated in a deficiency case in 2010, which the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed. The substantive issues in those years centered on whether petitioner was a member of a partnership, and as such, should have recognized income and expenses allocable to his partnership interest. Apparently, while he allocated the income evenly between himself and his son, he had allocated the lion’s share of expenses to himself, and allowed his son (who presumably was subject to a lower marginal tax rate) to bear the brunt of taxation.

The Service proceeded with enforced collection activity for these years, resulting in a CDP hearing and subsequent Tax Court case, wherein the petitioner again attempted to litigate the underlying liability from 2004 through 2006. The Tax Court rightly disallowed this challenge (and ruled in favor of the Service, given that petitioner declined to divulge any financial information as to establish a collection alternative), which the Ninth Circuit again affirmed.

For some reason that does not appear in this designated order, petitioner ended up owing for 2015. The Service again attempted to collect this debt via levy, and petitioner requested a CDP hearing; he again attempted to raise the underlying liability from 2004 through 2006, without making any argument regarding 2015. And, in the meantime, petitioner managed to sue the Service in federal district court—which dismissed the case on similar grounds as the earlier 2004 – 2006 CDP case in Tax Court. The Ninth Circuit—for the third time—affirmed the decision in 2017.

This brings us to last week’s order, where the Service had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to 2004, 2005, and 2006, along with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on 2015 (because no collection alternative had been proposed). As might be anticipated, Judge Armen grants both motions, ending the case for Mr. Holdner (no doubt the Ninth Circuit will soon enjoy its fourth opportunity to weigh in).

I must confess two areas of confusion with Judge Armen’s opinion. First, he seems to grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on a basis other than a lack of jurisdiction—that is, that Mr. Holdner previously litigated the issues underlying his 2004 through 2006 tax years. But that’s not what deprives the Court of jurisdiction here; rather, that’s because petitioner did not demonstrate that he possessed a Notice of Determination relevant to 2004, 2005, or 2006, on the basis of which he timely petitioned the Tax Court. The Court need not address that substantive issue at all.

More importantly, I question why no penalty under section 6673 was imposed or threatened in this case. A taxpayer has a clear right to litigate the merits of a tax liability in a deficiency case. And, being charitable to Mr. Holdner, perhaps he was unaware that one cannot challenge that deficiency in a CDP hearing, when it has been previously litigated. But this case represents the third time that Mr. Holdner used the resources of the Tax Court, federal district court, Chief Counsel, the Tax Division, and/or the Ninth Circuit to litigate an issue that he was unquestionably barred from disputing. As we’ve noted previously, the Tax Court has the ability to impose these penalties even absent a request from the Service. While one might question the penalty’s efficacy in preventing further bad behavior—and while the Tax Court seems primarily to use these penalties in the case of more egregious tax protestor arguments—this case would seem a candidate for its application.

Docket No. 15602-15L, Great Lakes Concrete Products, LLC v. C.I.R. (Order Here)

Finally, Judge Holmes’s order on a motion to remand continues to explore the contours of Graev III and section 6751(b). Judge Holmes grants the Service’s motion to remand (to which petitioner consented), but orders the Service, in any new Notice of Determination to consider the following questions:

  • Is a failure to deposit penalty one “automatically calculated through electronic means”?
  • Is 6751(b) supervisor approval present in this case?
  • Is compliance with section 6751(b) part of the “verification” necessary under section 6330? Or, is it rather, part of challenge to underlying liability?
  • Does the taxpayer qualify for a reasonable cause exception from the penalties?

I do not purport to answer any of the above questions, but it’s interesting to note the degree of control that Judge Holmes exercises on this issue in retaining jurisdiction and requiring an answer to particular questions in the subsequent Notice of Determination. We’ll stay tuned in this case, and others, that continue to develop the Tax Court’s 6751(b) jurisprudence.


Comment Policy: While we all have years of experience as practitioners and attorneys, and while Keith and Les have taught for many years, we think our work is better when we generate input from others. That is one of the reasons we solicit guest posts (and also because of the time it takes to write what we think are high quality posts). Involvement from others makes our site better. That is why we have kept our site open to comments.

If you want to make a public comment, you must identify yourself (using your first and last name) and register by including your email. If you do not, we will remove your comment. In a comment, if you disagree with or intend to criticize someone (such as the poster, another commenter, a party or counsel in a case), you must do so in a respectful manner. We reserve the right to delete comments. If your comment is obnoxious, mean-spirited or violates our sense of decency we will remove the comment. While you have the right to say what you want, you do not have the right to say what you want on our blog.

Speak Your Mind