Congress Set to Enact Only Now-Unneeded Innocent Spouse Fixes, Part 1

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Sometimes, Congress drives me batty.  Its latest silliness is proposing to resolve legislatively two formerly-contested issues under the section 6015 innocent spouse provisions in the taxpayer-favorable ways that the courts and the IRS already had settled those issues many years ago.  

Section 1203 of the new Taxpayer First Act of 2019, as introduced in both houses, proposes to modify section 6015 in two ways: (1) It would codify judicial holdings that reviews of IRS determinations of equitable relief under subsection (f) are de novo as to scope and standard, and (2) It would amend subsection (f) to codify the IRS notice from 2011 that allows essentially unlimited time to request relief — effectively overruling the 2-year limit for requesting such relief contained in Reg. Sec. 1.6015-1(b)(5).  These are proposals that Nina Olson had long ago sought in prior annual reports to Congress (in 2011 and 2006, respectively). The House bill, H.R. 1957, was marked up in the Ways & Means Committee on April 2.  The Senate bill, S. 928, has been introduced by Senator Grassley, the Chair of the Finance Committee, but has not yet been marked up.

Sadly, however, the Taxpayer First Act of 2019 will not also amend section 6015, as Nina Olson has also asked in her annual reports, (1) to make the subsection (e) filing deadline nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable exceptions and (2) to clarify that section 6015 relief can be raised in district court collection suits brought by the DOJ and in district court and Court of Federal Claims refund suits brought by taxpayers. The latter changes would actually modify current case law.

In this first of a two-part post, I will only discuss the scope and standard of review modification.

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Background on Trial Scope and Standard

I apologize to older PT readers who vividly recall the battles described below, but since many of the events happened a decade ago, younger PT readers may be unaware of the battles and the number of en banc Tax Court opinions that formed parts of those battles.  Below is my own description of the background, but you can also find the Joint Committee on Taxation’s description of the background at “Description of H.R. 1957, The ‘Taxpayer First Act of 2019’”, JCX-15-19 (Apr. 1, 2019).

Shortly after the section 6015 innocent spouse provision was enacted in 1998, the courts wrestled with the issue of what is the standard of judicial review under the equitable relief subsection, (f). While the courts and the IRS readily agreed that the standard of judicial review of determinations under subsections (b) and (c) is de novo, the courts decided that the standard of judicial review of determinations under subsection (f) is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2002) (in which section 6015(b), (c), and (f) relief were raised as defenses in a Tax Court deficiency proceeding brought under section 6123(a)).  

There was also litigation over whether the Tax Court, in a stand-alone innocent spouse proceeding brought under section 6015(e), had jurisdiction to rule on subsection (f) relief and, if so, was the court limited to reviewing the administrative record, or did it do a trial de novo in which any relevant evidence could be introduced?

In Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 494, 498-507 (2002) (en banc), the Tax Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide subsection (f) relief in a proceeding involving relief sought from an underpayment brought under subsection (e).  In a later opinion in the case, the Tax Court also held that the scope of such a proceeding under (f) was the same as that under subsections (b) and (c) — a trial de novo as to evidence — even though the standard of review under subsection (f) was abuse of discretion. 122 T.C. 32 (2004) (en banc).

Ewing was vacated by the Ninth Circuit because that court held that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to make subsection (f) determinations in subsection (e) stand-alone proceedings. 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). Almost immediately thereafter, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit; Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2006); and the Tax Court reversed course on the jurisdictional question and decided to follow those appellate rulings. Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006) (en banc).

In response, in December 2006, Congress amended subsection (e) to explicitly give the Tax Court jurisdiction to consider subsection (f) relief in stand-alone proceedings.

Thereafter, in Porter v. Commissioner (Porter I), 130 T.C. 115 (2008) (en banc), the Tax Court again held that relief under subsection (f) in a proceeding under subsection (e) was to be determined after a trial de novo as to evidence. And, the following year, in Porter v. Commissioner (Porter II), 132 T.C. 203 (2009) (en banc), the Tax Court held that, when Congress amended the statute in 2006, Congress also intended that henceforward the standard of judicial review under subsection (f) — whether in subsection (e) or deficiency proceedings — should be de novo.

The IRS challenged the rulings of both Porter I and II, not by appealing that case, but by appealing rulings in two other cases. However, in Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009), relying on the reasoning of Porter I, the Eleventh Circuit held that a proceeding under subsection (e) concerning relief under subsection (f) should be de novo as to evidence admitted. (In Neal, which was argued before the Tax Court decided Porter II, the parties and the court continued to assume that the standard of review in such cases was for abuse of discretion.  See, id., at 1276.)  

And, in Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit both (1) agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Neal and the Tax Court in Porter I and held that the scope of review of determinations under subsection (f) was now de novo and (2) agreed with the Tax Court in Porter II that the standard of review was also de novo.

In 2011, Nina Olson asked Congress to amend section 6015 to codify the rulings in Porter I and IINTA 2011Annual Report to Congress, Legislative Recommendation #4, at Vol. I, pp. 533-536.

In 2013, the IRS announced that it would no longer contest the rulings in Porter I and II.  Notice CC-2013-011, Litigating Cases that Involve Claims for Relief from Joint and Several Liability Under Section 6015 (June 7, 2013).

However, just “to eliminate any ambiguity and preclude future changes in the IRS’s litigating position”, Nina Olson has continued to call for a legislative codification of the Porter I and II rulings — most recently in her Purple Book accompanying her 2018 Annual Report to Congress, pp. 91-92.

Proposed Statutory Language on Trial Scope and Standard

Section 1203(a)(1) of the Taxpayer First Act of 2019 would amend section 6015(e) to add at the end thereof a new paragraph (7) reading as follows:

(7) STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW. — Any review of a determination made under this section shall be reviewed de novo by the Tax Court and shall be based upon —

(A) the administrative record established at the time of the determination, and

(B) any additional newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.

Carlton Smith About Carlton Smith

Carlton M. Smith worked (as an associate and partner) at Roberts & Holland LLP in Manhattan from 1983-1999. From 2003 to 2013, he was the Director of the Cardozo School of Law tax clinic. In his retirement, he volunteers with the tax clinic at Harvard, where he will be Acting Director from January to June 2019.

Comments

  1. Norman Diamond says

    ” (7) STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW. — Any review of a determination made under this section shall be reviewed de novo by the Tax Court and shall be based upon —
    (A) the administrative record established at the time of the determination, and
    (B) any additional newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.”

    Section 6015 is the only one that gives Tax Court jurisdiction when the IRS refuses to issue a notice. Six months after submitting an administrative request for relief, the person can petition. There is no administrative record. The petitioner can present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, but cannot present evidence which the petitioner already knew about when submitting an administrative request for relief?

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