We welcome designated order guest blogger William Schmidt from the Legal Aid Society of Kansas who writes on this week’s designated orders. In the first case petitioners make an argument that has been made before and failed. It fails again because their agreement in the criminal case about the scope of prosecution does not prohibit the IRS from pursuing them to determine their correct civil tax liability. Keith
For the week of September 3 to 7, there were 6 designated orders from the Tax Court. The first two are regarding two separate petitioners requesting to consolidate their cases and filing motions for summary judgment based on a plea agreement from prior litigation. The next 2 are a pair of orders that follow up from a previous posting (March). There is another Graev follow-up case. The final order, here, deals with a Collection Due Process hearing where petitioners question why they were audited for a home office expense when they were not audited in prior years.
read more...The Plea Agreement Does Not Cover Tax Court
Docket No. 22616-17, Krystina L. Szabo v. C.I.R., available here.
Docket No. 22560-17, Michael P. Martin v. C.I.R., available here.
This pair of Tax Court designated orders for a married couple are very similar, but distinct. In fact, the cases have so much in common, the couple filed motions to consolidate their cases, but those motions are denied.
Both petitioners were responsible for the daily activities of Pony Express Services, LLC. The company provided foster care and related services to persons with mental handicaps in western Virginia and maintained and operated three group homes there. Mr. Martin was the owner while Ms. Szabo was an employee and program manager.
In December 2006, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia filed charges against the couple for conspiracy to defraud Medicare, Medicaid and the IRS. Among the charges were that the object of the conspiracy was to enrich the couple by falsely and fraudulently billing Medicaid for residential services not rendered and services not provided in the manner envisioned and required by Medicaid, plus maximizing the couple’s proceeds by utilizing what is called the foster home tax credit [actually referring to IRC section 131] when falsely informing their accountant they resided separately in two of the residential facilities.
The couple filed a plea agreement, acknowledged by the assistant U.S. attorney, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Within the plea agreement, it states there will be no further prosecution regarding the couple in the Western District of Virginia. The plea agreement is limited to the Western District of Virginia. The plea agreement does not address potential civil tax liabilities or agreements regarding those liabilities. Ms. Szabo and Mr. Martin were each sentenced to 27 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release and paid a joint and several restitution to the U.S. Department of Medical Assistance Services of $173,174.65. They satisfied the judgment.
In separate notices of deficiency to Ms. Szabo and Mr. Martin, dated August 2, 2017, the IRS determined separate liabilities and penalties for each of them regarding tax years 2003 and 2004. The parties timely filed their separate petitions with Tax Court.
Each party filed a separate motion for summary judgment, contending that the plea agreement prevents the IRS from civilly determining, assessing or collecting the deficiencies in income tax or penalties for 2003 and 2004. They also contend that the government did not preserve its rights to pursue the criminal defendants for tax assessments and penalties after the entry of criminal judgment. Even though Mr. Martin’s motion was filed prematurely, the Court determined that it would be refiled anyway so chose to proceed on a substantive basis on his motion.
The Court determined that the plea agreement did not address the civil assessment and collection of taxes and does not bar the IRS from proceeding civilly. The plea agreement does not prevent the IRS from its determination, assessment or collection of tax, penalties, and additions to tax for the years at issue. The Court denied the motions for summary judgment of both petitioners.
Regarding the motions to consolidate, the Court admits the cases have much in common. The Court states the decision for consolidation is best left to the discretion of the trial judge. The Court denied the motions to consolidate without prejudice to the petitioners, allowing them the chance to refile the motions when calendared for trial.
Takeaway: I am not sure whether the petitioners believed their plea agreement would apply to the IRS or United States Tax Court or they were taking a chance on that legal argument, but I would suggest being more familiar with documents like the plea agreement in question before arguing that it is a document controlling for the IRS or the United States Tax Court.
Followup for Ms. March
Docket No. 6161-17 L, Debra L. March v. C.I.R.
I previously wrote about Ms. March regarding Tax Court designated orders here. While the first order there had the issue of how the IRS could reinstate an assessment after potentially being abated, the other order concerned a motion to show cause. Both of the orders this week follow up on that order on the motion to show cause.
Ms. March did not file her tax returns for 2009 and 2010. The IRS audited her for not reporting her income, assessed tax and filed notices of lien against her. She requested a collection due process hearing before IRS Appeals. Appeals issued a notice of determination sustaining the lien filings. Ms. March petitioned Tax Court and the IRS proposed facts and evidence be established as provided in Rule 91(f). They filed a motion for an order to show cause on August 8, 2018. The Tax Court granted the motion by an order on August 10, 2018.
- Order 1 here.
As of this order, Ms. March did not file a response in compliance with the Court’s August 10 order. Instead, she mailed to the Court a document entitled “Amended Petition,” received August 29, 2018. The document does not respond or refer to the proposed stipulation, but alleges defects in how the IRS handled her case.
Since an amended petition cannot be filed as a matter of course, but only by order of the Court in response to a motion for leave in Rule 41(a) (which Ms. March did not file), the Court ordered that it was to be filed as a response to the order to show cause.
The Court orders that the order to show cause is absolute, deeming the facts stipulated regarding her receipt of income and non-filing of the tax returns. She does have the ability to move to be relieved from the deemed stipulations at trial, but would need to present proof of contrary facts.
Her filing stated, “The IRS did not read or address the issues I brought up in my letters about IRS’ failure to issue and mail valid Notices of Deficiency to me.” The Court is unsure whether this statement means that she believes the IRS did not issue valid notices of deficiency or whether she did not receive those notices. As stated above, she would be able to make these arguments at trial but would need to show evidence.
In the Court’s order, it provides that Ms. March is welcome to contact the Chambers Administrator to schedule a telephone conference with the Court and the IRS.
- Order 2 here.
The Court received filings from Ms. March on September 4, 2018, deemed to be a motion for reconsideration of the order above (dated August 31), making absolute the August 10 order to show cause, and a declaration in support of that motion.
Even though Ms. March was a day late in her response, the Court exercised its discretion to treat it as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 161 and addressed its merits. She does not address the issues of her receipt of income or non-filing of returns. Instead, she criticizes how the IRS handled her case and argues that the Tax Court review is limited to the administrative record in a collection due process case (citing Robinette v. Commissioner, an 8th Circuit case).
The Court’s view is that it is not confined to the administrative record in collection due process cases, especially when the case involves a challenge to the underlying liability, pursuant to IRC section 6330(c)(2)(B), resembling a more typical deficiency case. In this instance, the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit is the appellate court with jurisdiction (not the 8th Circuit), but the 10th Circuit has not spoken on the issue. Ms. March citied Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., which is a 10th Circuit case, but it is not a collection due process case, does not relate to tax, and was decided before IRC section 6330 was enacted.
While the Court does not address whether 6330(c)(2)(B) prevents Ms. March from challenging her underlying liability as the IRS states she had a prior “opportunity to dispute such tax liability,” the Court states both parties are permitted to provide evidence outside the administrative record.
As Ms. March did not respond to the proposed stipulations from the IRS, the Court did not vacate the order making the order to show cause absolute and the deemed stipulations still stand.
Additionally, Ms. March explains that she has health problems that would make it difficult for her to appear at trial. She would like the case to be fully stipulated and decided pursuant to Rule 122. She also suggests that the contents of the administrative record be stipulated. The Court does not agree the stipulation should be limited to the administrative record, but encourages the parties to attempt a comprehensive stipulation for the case under Rule 122. That is not an order as the case was not submitted that way yet, but will be addressed if presented that way later. Again, the Court encourages the parties to schedule a telephone conference.
Takeaway: Ms. March has some sophistication as a litigation since she is citing case law. However, her lack of responsiveness to the IRS and the Court do not help her case. Perhaps she was able to address these issues or deal with the stipulations under Rule 122 in time before her September trial date.
More Graev Fallout
Docket Nos. 23621-15 and 23647-15, Nathaniel A. Carter & Stella C. Carter, et al., v. C.I.R., (consolidated cases) available here.
Here are more cases affected by Graev v. Commissioner. The Carters have deficiencies and penalties for 2011 through 2013 while Mr. Evans has deficiencies and penalties for 2011 and 2012.
The Graev decision allowed for Court interpretation of IRC section 6751(b)(1). Specifically, the case held the IRS has a burden of production under section 7491(c) showing compliance with supervisory approval as required under 6751(b). Since the petitioners in these cases would be affected by section 6662 accuracy-related penalties, the IRS filed its motion to reopen the record to admit evidence to establish that the 6751(b)(1) requirements for supervisory approval have been met.
The factors the Court has to examine to determine whether to reopen a record are the timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony to be offered, the effect of granting the motion, and the reasonableness of the request. The third factor, the effect of granting the motion, is the most relevant.
The IRS seeks to reopen the record to admit declarations of Donald Maclennan, a Supervisory Internal Revenue Agent, and a separate Civil Penalty Approval Form in each case. The petitioners object, stating the exhibits contain inadmissible hearsay. Additionally, one Civil Penalty Approval Form shows a printed date in April 2014, more than a year earlier than Mr. Maclennan’s signature block in May 2015. The two forms call for a signature but show only his printed name. Each of the forms lack justification for his approval.
The Court finds that the forms fall under the exception to the hearsay rule for records of a regularly conducted activity and the declarations fit into evidence that is self-authenticating. The Court admits that the lack of signatures on the forms will go to the weight of the evidence, but are not part of the hearsay evaluation. They show approval by a “Group Manager” and do not explicitly indicate the manager was an “immediate supervisor,” as required under 6751(b)(1). The forms lack evidence of facts necessary for the IRS to meet the required burden. The declarations are meant to bolster the forms but the Court determines that the IRS cannot rely on the declarations for purposes of meeting the burden of production to show the “immediate supervisor” approved the penalty determinations.
Having determined to open the record to allow the IRS to offer evidence that the 6751(b)(1) requirements are satisfied, the Court is allowing the IRS the opportunity to offer admissible evidence or make argument to show the requisite managerial approval. The petitioners have 30 days to conduct discovery regarding whether Mr. Maclennan was Mr. Dickerson’s immediate supervisor (as part of meeting the requirements). The parties may stipulate if they agree by filing a supplemental stipulation of facts. If they do not, either party may move for a supplementary evidentiary hearing to introduce evidence. The IRS may make further argument there are grounds sufficient for the Court to infer Mr. Maclennan’s supervisory status.
The Court grants the IRS motion and received the forms into evidence and the declarations are received into evidence as supporting documents for the forms. The petitioners are ordered to have 30 days to conduct discovery. Either party may move for a supplemental hearing on or before October 9. If neither party requests that hearing, petitioners have until October 19 to notify the court regarding their argument as to Mr. Maclennan’s supervisory role. If notifying the Court, they have until November 9 to file a memorandum of law making that argument.
Takeaway: From my observation, the IRS seemed to be broadly winning the arguments that they met the factors needed to reopen the record to admit evidence in prior cases. In this case, both parties are providing evidence that the Court will evaluate. I think this a balanced approach to weighing the factors regarding reopening the record in a Tax Court case affected by Graev.
About William Schmidt
“In separate notices of deficiency to Ms. Szabo and Mr. Martin, dated August 2, 2017, the IRS determined separate liabilities and penalties for each of them regarding tax years 2003 and 2004.”
When I figured out that the IRS is required to send me CP-2000 (or other Notice of Mathematical or Clerical Error) for years when the IRS had no records of my withholding (which a stockbroker reported on Form 1099, the same form from which an IRS data entry clerk was jailed for embezzling withholding), and when I figured out that the IRM compels the IRS to issue Notice(s) of Deficiency when I demand them for amounts that the IRS refuses to abate, I did demand them. The IRS issued a refusal to issue CP-2000 and Notice of Deficiency for tax years more than 3 years in the past. Well we see here, the IRS is perfectly well aware that there is no 3 year limit on issuing Notices of Deficiency.
Tax Court SOMETIMES gives itself jurisdiction when the IRS issues a notice different from what the IRS is statutorily required to issue (famously Craig, and one of my earlier cases). Tax Court SOMETIMES refuses to take jurisdiction when the IRS doesn’t issue the notice that the IRS is statutorily required to issue (famously Trefry, almost famously Edwards, and one of my recent cases). Tax Court SOMETIMES grants petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when the IRS didn’t issue the statutorily required notice. Tax Court SOMETIMES grants respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the withheld money in the possession of embezzlers.
This is not my first time to petition Supreme Court with a motion for IFP. My first two petitions had IFP motions denied because my income was almost enough for living expenses and 45 years of labour had yielded enough savings that the court expected me to spend three months’ salary for the expense of printing booklet format petitions (which of course have one chance in a thousand of getting cert). Now my income is less than half of living expenses and other employers reject job applications because of my age, so is it reasonable for a pauper to ask Supreme Court if Tax Court should have jurisdiction and if not then which party’s dismissal motion should be accepted? I found some imported US size paper for only twice the price of international standard size paper, submitted the original and 10 copies on 8.5×11 inch paper to the court and one copy on A4 paper to the Solicitor General. A Supreme Court clerk sent them back with a letter saying that petitions accompanied by IFP motions must include copies of orders as issued by lower courts instead of being retyped in Century font. I corrected the petitions, submitted them again (original and 10 copies on 8.5×11 inch paper to the court, and one completely new copy on A4 paper to the Solicitor General), but have received no response. No docket number. Not even a denial of IFP motion. I left messages on the clerk’s answering machine five times and she did not call back. USPS’s web site shows that my corrected petition, mailed with tracking number EF826460955JP, was delivered 2018-09-07.
So is there a 3 year statute of limitations on issuing Notices of Deficiency? The answer seems to depend on which party is the one committing fraud. Does Tax Court get jurisdiction based on notices that the IRS is statutorily required to issue even when the IRS issues the wrong notice? The answer seems to depend on which party is the one committing fraud. Does a taxpayer have the right to pay the correct amount of tax? The answer seems to depend on which party would benefit.
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“Takeaway: Ms. March has some sophistication as a litigation since she is citing case law.”
Maybe she’s learning gradually while the case proceeds. Maybe she reads PT.
Sorry for the tangent but this needs a followup:
“I corrected the petitions, submitted them again (original and 10 copies on 8.5×11 inch paper to the court, and one completely new copy on A4 paper to the Solicitor General), but have received no response.”
Yesterday the clerk answered the phone and gave me the docket number.
I haven’t checked yet to see if the downloadable PDF of my IFP motion includes the names of financial institutions holding my life’s savings. The reason why one US financial institution applied backup withholding was that the IRS used to publicly disclose social security numbers on mail, visible to everyone walking down the street when a letter carrier made a mistake, I applied for a replacement social security number, the SSA agreed, but the SSA dragged their heels and eventually reneged on their letter agreeing that I was eligible for replacement. Subsequently the US government publicly disclosed my SSN at least twice more. That, together with my name and address and names of financial institutions, is there anything more that an identity thief would need? Let alone identity thieves working in the IRS, one (or more) of whom stole my withholding.