Last year, we posted on the Tax Court’s decision in Lindsay Manor v. Commissioner, 148 T.C. 9 (2017). The taxpayer appealed the decision to the 10th Circuit, which has not only dismissed the appeal as moot but also vacated the Tax Court’s decision.
The Tax Court, in a precedential opinion, decided that a corporation could not avail itself of the hardship exception in IRC section 6343(a)(1)(D) holding, in support of Treas. Reg. 301.6343-1, that only individuals may avoid levy based on hardship.
On appeal, the government moved to dismiss the case as moot because Lindsay Manor no longer operated nursing home facilities. The 10th Circuit agreed because Lindsay Manor lacked a “personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” The only issue on appeal was the applicability of IRC section 6343(a)(1)(D) to corporate taxpayers. Lindsay Manor had argued that it qualified for hardship relief only “because imposing the levy would leave it unable to ‘provide adequate care for its patients.’” Since Lindsay Manor no longer has patients this ground for relief does not exist anymore.
In dismissing for mootness, the 10th Circuit looked into the facts surrounding the nursing home Lindsay Manor operated. It turns out that another creditor had a receiver appointed six months before the Tax Court published its opinion. So, the case was moot before the Tax Court published its opinion. In the Tax Court, the IRS filed two motions for summary judgment. The second motion was filed on October 14, 2015 with the response from petitioner on October 28, 2015. The opinion was rendered on March 22, 2017 – about 17 months later. So, Lindsay Manor was operating the nursing home at the time of the last action by the parties prior to the issuance of the opinion. Obviously, neither the petitioner nor the IRS alerted the Tax Court to the change in circumstance.
I looked for a Tax Court Rule obligating the parties to notify the Court but could not find one. I know that the IRS feels under an obligation to tell the Court when something happens that impacts jurisdiction and provides instructions to Chief Counsel attorneys for notification in the situation presented by this case, bankruptcy filings, etc. The IRS would not necessarily have known about the appointment of the receiver or at least not in a way that would naturally make its way to their Counsel. If petitioner’s counsel knew that his client had been replaced by a receiver, he probably should have notified the Tax Court although I could not file a Rule obliging him to do so. If either party had notified the Court, I expect that the notification would have caused the Tax Court to not issue the opinion in the first place. Although the 10th Circuit talks below about what the Tax Court should have done, absent notification from one of the parties the Tax Court would have no reason to know of the change in circumstances. A quicker opinion might have averted the problem but this case was one of several with similar issues. I find the criticism of the Tax Court on this point misplaced. I was ready to place blame on petitioner’s counsel for not notifying the Court since he was the person most likely to know of the change in circumstances forming a basis for the vacatur but any criticism of petitioner’s counsel would require that they had notice of the receiver coupled with a duty to inform the Court.
The 10th Circuit stated:
“If an actual case or controversy ceases to exist during the course of tax court proceedings, the tax court must dismiss the case as moot.” Willson, 805 F.3d at 320. This case became moot when the court appointed the receiver. After that, Lindsay Manor no longer operated any nursing homes and consequently could not receive economic hardship relief. The Tax Court published its decision on March 23, 2017 – over six months after the receiver had been appointed and after the case had become moot. Rather than deciding the case’s merits, then, the Tax Court should have ‘dismiss[ed] the case as moot.’ Id. Vacatur is therefore appropriate.”
So, we have a sneak peek at what the Tax Court thinks about the regulation but the case itself no longer provides precedent for the position sustaining the regulation that economic hardship does not apply to corporations.
It would be interesting to read the order appointing the receiver for Lindsay Manor. The scope of a receiver’s powers and estate are only as set forth in the court order appointing him/her. Therefore, appointment of a receiver will not automatically render an existing case moot.