Bob Probasco

Filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien For Personal Property

July 15, 2022 by Guest Blogger 4 Comments

Today PT contributor Bob Probasco brings us a recent case that demonstrates the value of verifying that the IRS followed proper procedures in filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.

A recent decision by a bankruptcy court, In re: Vanessa Catherine Stephenson, (docket no. 21-22684 in the Western District of Tennessee), is a reminder of potential pitfalls for the IRS when filing a notice of federal tax lien (NFTL). The IRS identified part of its claim as secured by the debtor’s personal property, based on an NFTL filed on August 21, 2018. The debtor/taxpayer objected, arguing that the entire claim was unsecured because the NFTL was not filed properly and did not attach. The court identified this as issue of first impression. After two hearings and additional briefing, the court agreed with the debtor. The NFTL was filed in the wrong county and therefore not effective/invalid. The entire IRS claim was unsecured.

Background

Ms. Stephenson moved around the country a lot during 2016 – 2018: Longmont, Colorado; Fort Mills, South Carolina; Keeling, Virginia; Semora, North Carolina; and finally Shelby County, Tennessee, where she resided when the NFTL was filed. However, she filed her 2017 tax return using her mother’s address, in Benton County, Tennessee. She also used that address for employment purposes and as a result received W-2s showing that address. The IRS, using the information it had, filed the NFTL in Benton County rather than Shelby County.

Where to file an NFTL

Section 6323(f)(1) specifies that an NFTL is to be filed in the appropriate office of the state (or county or other subdivision), as designated by the state, where the property is situated. Where is the property situated? Section 6323(f)(2) specifies that as the physical location (for real property) or the taxpayer’s residence at the time the lien is filed (for personal property).

Corwin Consultants, Inc. v. Interpublic Group of Cos., 512 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1975) pointed out that prior to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, there was “some dispute as to where personal property, both tangible and intangible, was situated” but in most cases intangibles were located at the taxpayer’s domicile. For section 6232(f)(2), the drafters deliberately chose residence instead of domicile “because of the difficulty in determining a person’s domicile, based as it is on (among other things) his state of mind” (quoting the legislative history). The district court in Corwin decided that the debtor/taxpayer’s residence could not be determined but treated the NFTL as valid because of due diligence and substantial compliance by the IRS.

The Second Circuit rejected that decision as premature and remanded for the district court to try again to determine the facts. It acknowledged that might not be obvious, because residence “when used in a sense other than domicile, is one of the most nebulous terms in the legal dictionary.” It also noted the importance of other creditors receiving notice as to possible claims by the IRS.

In light of this purpose, the residence of a delinquent taxpayer is a question of fact to be determined by various criteria: Among them are the taxpayer’s physical presence as an inhabitant and not a mere transient; the permanence of that presence; the reason for his presence; and the existence of other residences. In general, for this statute, where a taxpayer resides is where he dwells for a significant amount of time and where creditors would be most likely to look for him. What proportion of time is “significant” is not capable of exact definition and must be determined on a case by case basis, at all times keeping the purpose of the filing requirement in mind.

One of the judges on the Corwin panel concurred with remanding to the district court but disagreed with the burden of proof (or reasonable effort/due diligence) that should be placed on the government. He would have construed section 6323(f)(2)(B)

to mean that, where the government cannot through reasonable inquiry ascertain a taxpayer’s actual residence, it may satisfy the statute’s requirement by filing notice of its judgment lien with the state-designated office within the jurisdiction of the taxpayer’s last known or verifiable abode. This practical construction seems to me to be in accord with the purpose of the statute, which is to put other creditors on notice, since they too would be most likely to inquire about liens in the county of the last residence of the taxpayer that could be ascertained by reasonable effort.

It would not be enough, though, to rely on the last address shown on IRS tax records, which can’t readily be determined by other creditors. Additional effort would be required to determine the “last publicly known address of a taxpayer.” The concurring opinion did not go into further detail.

Compare to notices of deficiency

Even the standard set forth in the Corwin concurring opinion is more challenging that the IRS requirement for mailing a notice of deficiency. Section 6212(b)(1) specifies that the notice of deficiency for income taxes, with limited exceptions, be sent to the “last known address.” Absent clear and concise notification by the taxpayer, courts allow the IRS to use the address on the taxpayer’s most recently filed tax return. (For the definition of “last known address” and how taxpayers can provide the clear and concise notification, refer to Regulation § 301.6212-2 and Rev. Proc. 2010-16. It’s also worth revisiting Audrey Patten’s PT post on the Gregory case.)

Courts generally impose an obligation to do more only if the IRS becomes aware of an address change prior to mailing the notice. For example, if the notice itself is returned by the Post Office, the IRS may try to find a different address – but the Tax Court will not require the IRS to do that. Tucker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-408 has a good summary of caselaw on this. It also describes a few practices the IRS may use to find a different address: rechecking IRS records, checking with credit rating agencies, and checking with the Post Office for a forwarding address.

It is reasonable to treat notices of deficiency and NFTLs differently in terms of how much effort is required from the IRS. The “last known address” rule for notices of deficiency protects only the taxpayer. If the taxpayer has not notified the IRS of a new address, or taken steps to have mail forwarded, it’s only the taxpayer injured by that inaction. The “residence” rule for NFTLs is primarily aimed at protecting other creditors. They don’t have access to IRS records, to know where the IRS might have filed an NFTL and would be disadvantaged if they don’t realize the IRS is likely to, and can, file elsewhere.

Back to the Stephenson case

The IRS argued that it should be entitled to use the mother’s address for the NFTL because Ms. Stephenson had “held out” that as her home address on tax returns and W-2. The court rejected that argument because it found “no binding legal support that the IRS was entitled to use the address Ms. Stephenson held out as her home address as the place Ms. Stephenson resided when it was not in fact the address where she physically resided.” It cited another bankruptcy case, affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, that rejected the “last known address” interpretation because it would “read . . . additional language into the statute.” (It also referred to the concurring opinion in Corwin.) Based on the testimony at trial, Ms. Stephenson did not reside in Benton County when the NFTL was filed there. The NFTL was invalid and the entire IRS claim was unsecured.

Even if this was a “case of first impression,” I think the opinion is consistent with most practitioners’ understanding or interpretation of the statute. It creates problems for the IRS, for example, when the taxpayer has moved but not yet filed a tax return. This case points out another example, when the taxpayer doesn’t use her actual residence for her tax returns. That may not be common, but it certainly happens. Whether it’s worth additional IRS effort to identify the taxpayer’s actual residence before filing the NFTL, or it’s better to just lose occasional bankruptcy disputes over priority, is another question.

The process is intended to provide notice to parties who subsequently provide the taxpayer credit (or purchase real property). If such parties wouldn’t be able to find the NFTL through a lien search, the IRS should not be given a place in the line ahead of those parties. Courts generally won’t apply a strict compliance standard. They focus on whether a purchaser or subsequent creditor could have found the lien, even with some errors in the lien filing, through reasonable care and diligence during a search. Here’s an example: U.S. v. Z Investment Properties, LLC, 921 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2019).

The “residence” rule generally does a good job of protecting other creditors; at least the lien will be reported in the proper county. However, it’s not perfect. Even if the IRS has the right address initially, that won’t help later creditors after the taxpayer has moved. Filing the NFTL in the county where the taxpayer resides at the time means it will attach to the personal property even after she moves. But other creditors in the new location would have no warning that they needed to check lien registries in previous places the taxpayer lives. That’s not the only problem with notice of a lien, but it’s a significant one. Keith’s proposal of a national tax lien registry seems a much better solution for both the IRS and other creditors.

Filed Under: Federal Tax Lien Tagged With: Bob Probasco

Creativity Is Not Always Rewarded

July 13, 2022 by Guest Blogger 1 Comment

In June, the Tax Court issued a division opinion in Chavis v. Commissioner, 158 T.C. No. 8, a Collection Due Process case. The taxpayer, proceeding pro se, raised three arguments. I’m going to put them in a different order than the Court did, saving the best for last. First, she sought to challenge the underlying liability. The IRS argued and the court agreed that she had a prior opportunity to dispute it, even if she hadn’t taken advantage of it. Under the current status of the law, that result was anticipated, although many of us wish that either the IRS or Congress would change that.

Second, she requested “currently not collectible” status and withdrawal of the notice of federal tax lien. Given that the Settlement Officer disagreed and that the abuse of discretion standard applied, you already can guess how that was decided.

Finally, she raised a different – and creative! – argument concerning why she shouldn’t have to pay. My guess is that this argument is why the Court issued a division opinion instead of a memorandum opinion; it’s also why I chose to write this post. I’m not sure that argument would have ever occurred to me or that I would have raised it if it had occurred to me. I’m also not surprised that the argument lost; it was certainly a long shot.

Background

Ms. Chavis and her former husband worked, as the Secretary and President respectively, at Oasys Information Systems, Inc., a C corporation. The business address for Oasys was Ms. Chavis’s home address. Oasys withheld payroll taxes from employees’ wages but never paid the taxes over to the government. The amount was substantial enough that the IRS pursued trust fund recovery penalties under section 6672 against both Ms. Chavis and her former husband. The IRS issued Letter 1153 Notice of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty to both Ms. Chavis and her then-husband on July 13, 2015, proposing to assess $146,682 against each of them.

The Letter 1153 informs responsible parties that they can appeal to the local Appeals Office within 60 days and provides detailed instructions on how to do that. Ms. Chavis did not appeal. On November 16, 2015, the IRS assessed. She and her husband divorced in 2016 and the IRS apparently collected some of that amount from the husband. The IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien on May 29, 2019 and issued Ms. Chavis a collection notice stating her right to a CDP hearing. She timely requested a hearing and, when Appeals ruled against her, filed a Tax Court petition.

The first two (my order) arguments

These were the easiest for the Court to dispose of. The decision that Ms. Chavis could not challenge the underlying liability was expected. For assessable penalties, an opportunity to dispute the liability at Appeals is treated as sufficient. Judicial review in a pre-payment forum – Tax Court – is not required. The IRS and the Court consider that a settled issue, unfortunately, for assessable penalties, including the TFRP. If you’d like a refresher on why that’s a bad result, start with a couple of posts (here and here) by Keith. Ms. Chavis had that opportunity to go to Appeals; she acknowledged receiving the Letter 1153 and signed the return receipt. So the court didn’t consider this argument.

Similarly, the collection alternatives that Ms. Chavis suggested – CNC status and withdrawal of the NFTL – were rejected by the Settlement Officer and the Court easily concluded that the rejection was not an abuse of discretion. The SO found that she could pay $1,685 per month toward the liability. Ms. Chavis argued that the calculation of $1,685 per month available income was “unreasonable and not economically feasible.” As the Court noted:

In determining this figure, the SO calculated allowable monthly expenses by reference to local standards prevailing in the Missouri county where petitioner resided. . . . The SO was authorized to rely on those standards in assessing petitioner’s ability to pay, and it was her burden to justify a departure from the local standards. . . . Petitioner has not satisfied that burden.

However, it appears that the real issue may have been assets rather than income. The SO had disallowed home mortgage expenses of $1,611 because Ms. Chavis had not proved that she had no equity in the home. See IRM 5.16.1.2.9(1): “An account should not be reported as CNC if the taxpayer has income or equity in assets, and enforced collection of the income or assets would not cause hardship.” Ms. Chavis argued that she did not have “access” to any equity, but she hadn’t submitted evidence during the CDP hearing. She lived in Missouri, so the court’s review was limited to the administrative record per Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).

The request to withdraw the NFTL also failed. The Court reviewed the conditions under which a withdrawal is authorized, in section 6323(j), and concluded that all but one either clearly did not apply or had not been asserted by Ms. Chavis. For that final condition – that withdrawal would facilitate the collection of the tax liability – Ms. Chavis had not presented any evidence in the CDP hearing.

Creativity!

Those arguments didn’t prevail but Ms. Chavis had one more up her sleeve. You’ve probably guessed even if you didn’t read the opinion. She was married at the time the TFRP was assessed. Both she and her then-husband were liable for the entire amount. What does that suggest? Relief from joint and several liability under section 6015!

Ms. Chavis checked the box for innocent spouse relief, among others, on her request for a CDP hearing on May 29, 2019. In July 2019, she submitted Form 8857 to the Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation. CCISO told her within a few weeks that she did not qualify for section 6015 relief, but Ms. Chavis still argued for it (unsuccessfully) during the CDP hearing. It’s not clear whether she also argued for it in her response to the government’s motion for summary judgment.

As noted above, the Court rejected the challenge to the underlying liability because Ms. Chavis had a prior opportunity to dispute it. An innocent spouse claim is a defense against, rather than challenge to, the underlying liability and therefore is not precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B) from review as part of the CDP hearing.

As the court pointed out, subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015 both reference the taxpayer filing a joint return (i.e., income tax) and provide for relief for an understatement or deficiency with respect to that return. Because the deficiency in this case arose from TFRP for the corporation’s payroll taxes, subsections (b) and (c) would not apply. However, subsection (f) does not include such a reference to a joint return.

This may remind you of the situation several years ago with respect to the statute of limitations for innocent spouse claims under subsection (f). The Code provided a two-year statute of limitations for subsection (b) and (c) claims but did not specify a statute of limitations for (f) claims. So, the IRS and Treasury issued a regulation to establish a two-year statute of limitations for (f) cases as well. The Tax Court ruled that regulation was invalid, interpreting the “audible silence” by Congress as an indication there should be no statute of limitations for (f) cases. Despite success in appeals to Circuit Courts, the IRS backed down and decided to limit (f) claims only by the ten-year statute of limitations for collection in section 6502. The Taxpayer First Act later established, at section 6015(f)(2), a statute of limitations: if unpaid, before the section 6502 collection statute of limitations expires, or if paid, before the section 6511 refund claim statute of limitations expires. It still doesn’t say anything about income tax or joint return in subsection (f).

Would the Tax Court refuse to import the “income tax only” provisions in (b) and (c) to (f)? Unfortunately for Ms. Chavis, the answer was no. The Court concluded easily that 6015(f) applies only to income tax. The caption for section 6015 is “Relief from joint and several liability on joint return.” Captions don’t always carry a lot of weight, but there was much, much more:

The Commissioner has specified, in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, the procedures governing equitable relief. These procedures confirm that subsection (f), like subsections (b) and (c), applies only to joint income tax liabilities. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 1.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 397 (“This revenue procedure provides guidance for a taxpayer seeking equitable relief from income tax liability. . . .”). Indeed, the IRS will not consider a taxpayer’s request for equitable relief unless she meets seven “threshold conditions,” one of which is that the “income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief” is attributable to the non-requesting spouse. Id. § 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. Another condition is that “[t]he requesting spouse [must have] filed a joint return for the taxable year” for which relief is sought. Id. § 4.01(1).

There is more than just a Revenue Procedure:

Although a TFRP liability is a form of “unpaid tax,” section 6015(f) applies only to unpaid taxes or deficiencies arising from joint income tax returns. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-1(a)(1)(iii) (stating that section 6015(f) applies only to “joint and several liability for Federal income tax”); H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1008 (stating that section 6015(f) applies only to “any unpaid tax or deficiency arising from a joint return”).

That seems very persuasive support for the conclusion that section 6015 relief is not available for the TFRP. Since section 6672 is an assessable penalty not subject to deficiency procedures, there is no judicial review of the validity of the penalty in Tax Court at all. Although this seems very clear, apparently it had never been decided by the court, which might explain why this was a division opinion instead of a memorandum opinion. Ms. Chavis seems to be the first one to ever argue in Tax Court for innocent spouse relief from the TFRP.

TFRP is also a divisible tax, so at least the Flora rule is not as much of a hurdle to judicial review, and there’s a right of contribution in section 6672(d). However, it’s still a nasty penalty and difficult to challenge once you don’t head it off at the interview stage.

Standard/scope of review – CDP versus innocent spouse

The opinion states the standard of review for CDP cases as follows:

Where the validity of the taxpayer’s underlying liability is properly at issue, we review the IRS’s determination de novo. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000). Where the taxpayer’s underlying liability is not properly at issue, we review the IRS’s decision for abuse of discretion only. Id. at 182.

That comes pretty much straight from the legislative history of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, which enacted the CDP hearing process of section 6330.

The court previously considered stand-alone innocent spouse cases under section 6015(e) de novo for both the standard of review and the scope of review. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009). The Taxpayer First Act of 2019 specified both the standard of review (de novo) and the scope of review (limited to the administrative record plus “any additional newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence”) in new section 6015(e)(7). The Chavis petition was filed on September 23, 2020, after the effective date of section 6015(e)(7). For more on the complexities of TFA and innocent spouse relief, start with Christine’s posts here and here.

So, we have two different standards/scopes of review – for CDP and for stand-alone innocent spouse cases. Which applies when dealing with an innocent spouse claim in a CDP hearing? standard and scope of It doesn’t matter for this case; although the court included the discussion under a section labeled “Abuse of Discretion,” it also noted in footnote 2:

We need not decide whether the SO’s resolution of petitioner’s spousal defense challenge should be reviewed de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. We would decide this issue the same way under either standard because (as explained in the text) it presents a purely legal question.

It does matter, though, when taxpayers have an innocent spouse claim with respect to income taxes in a CDP case.

A quick check of Effectively Representing Your Client Before the IRS turned up Francel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2019-35, which had already addressed this same scenario. The taxpayer in that case filed a request for innocent spouse relief before receiving the final notice of intent to levy. The request for a CDP hearing asked for innocent spouse relief. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction with respect to the innocent spouse issue under both section 6330(d)(1) and section 6015(e). The IRS argued that the standard of review should be abuse of discretion and the scope of review should be limited to the administrative record. (Dr. Francel lived in Missouri, as did Ms. Chavis, so the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Robinette applied.). The court concluded that both the standard of review and the scope of review would be de novo because the petition was (in part) a petition under section 6015(e)(1).

Francel was decided (a) before the Taxpayer First Act, which restricted the scope of review in innocent spouse cases, and (b) in one of the three circuits that restrict the scope of review to the administrative record in a CDP case. After the Taxpayer First Act, and in one of the other circuits, it’s possible to have a situation in which:

The standard of review is more favorable to the taxpayer under section 6015(e) – de novo – rather than under section 6330(d)(1) – abuse of discretion.
The scope of review is more favorable to the taxpayer under section 6330(d)(1) – de novo – than under section 6015(e) – limited evidence beyond the administrative record.

In a situation like that, how should the court evaluate the standard and scope of review? All or nothing, whether section 6330(d)(1) or section 6015(e)? Or mix-and-match, with the most favorable to the taxpayer for both standard of review (section 6015(e)) and scope of review (section 6330(d)(1))?

Footnote 2 in the Chavis case, quoted above, avoids deciding which standard and scope of review would apply in these situations. It didn’t matter for Ms. Chavis’s situation. Now that we have the Taxpayer First Act, will the court want to re-visit this question in a future case where the decision on the merits is not a purely legal question?

Filed Under: Qualified Offer, Tax Court Tagged With: Bob Probasco

No Rehearing En Banc for Goldring: Is Supreme Court Review Possible?

March 25, 2022 by Guest Blogger Leave a Comment

The last time we talked about Goldring v. United States, 15 F.4th 639 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021), the taxpayers had won their case for a refund of deficiency interest, creating a circuit split with FleetBoston Fin. Corp v. United States, 483 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On November 18th, the government petitioned for a rehearing en banc.

On March 2, 2022, after briefing by the parties in early December, the court denied the petition for rehearing en banc. The court was polled, with seven judges (Smith, Stewart, Dennis, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, and Costa) voting for rehearing and ten judges (Owen, Jones, Elrod, Southwick, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson) voting against. That may be the end of things, with taxpayers filing future cases in district courts rather than the Court of Federal Claims, hoping to repeat the Goldring result.

It’s also possible that the government will consider filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, hoping to reverse. For one thing, the government argued in its petition that there were more potential cases with this issue than I had anticipated.

The Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, has advised us that nearly 4.4 million individual taxpayers have claimed successive credit elects in the past three years. Chef Counsel estimates that approximately 25,000 of those individuals will have a later determined income-tax deficiency, and could file claims for refund of underpayment interest under the reasoning of the panel’s decision. For corporate taxpayers, to whom the panel’s reasoning equally applies, Chief Counsel foresees roughly 2,000 potential refund claims, which could range into the multiple millions of dollars. All of these claims must be manually processed, as the rule in this case would require the IRS to determine to what extent a taxpayer’s credit balances, year over year, offset a deficiency determination before interest can be computed on the difference.

Further, the panel’s opinion seemed to base the decision on a rationale with which the DOJ Tax Division strongly disagrees. The panel started with a statement about the purpose of interest. “Under the use-of-money principle, a taxpayer is liable for interest only when the Government does not have the use of money it is lawfully due.” It later noted “the simple, undisputed fact that the IRS was never deprived of its use of the money the Goldrings lawfully owed it at any point during the five-year underpayment interest assessment period.” But since the IRS held that money in accounts for other tax years, that sounds very much like a broad “netting” principle – that an overpayment in any tax year can be used to offset an underpayment in another tax year to reduce interest on the latter.

The DOJ Tax Division, on the other hand, construes the use-of-money principle more narrowly, as an aid for interpretation when the statute is ambiguous rather than a broad equitable principle. See a 2012 version of the DOJ Tax Division Settlement Reference Manual, specifically Appendix Y (Interest), page 2:

While case law is important in interpreting these statutes, interest liability may not be extended beyond what the statute prescribes. For example, the “use-of-money” principle is frequently invoked in tax cases. This principle, which is stated to be the rationale for charging interest, is a useful guide for interpreting interest statutes where the statute is ambiguous or where the application of the statute to a particular fact situation is unclear. Nonetheless, the use-of-money principle is not a principle of substantive law and (contrary to arguments sometimes advanced by taxpayers) cannot impose liability for interest that is beyond the scope of the Code’s interest provisions.

This is the most recent version of the manual I was able to find online. I’m not sure if there’s a more recent version, but I would be surprised if this attitude had changed in the past ten years.

I’ve heard/seen the attitude toward “use-of-money” arguments expressed somewhat more, shall we say, sharply or forcefully by at least one or two DOJ attorneys over the years. And the statutory netting provision of section 6621(d) is written more narrowly than the result in Goldring, arguably demonstrating that Congress specifically decided against offering the netting benefit that the Goldrings argued for. So, I wouldn’t be surprised if the DOJ attorneys here argued for a trip to the Supreme Court to try to overturn the Goldring result. I’m just speculating, of course, but I’d love to be a fly on the wall in the “Room of Lies” that Keith described here and here.

Filed Under: Interest, SCOTUS Tagged With: Bob Probasco

You Call That “Notice”? Seriously?

March 24, 2022 by Guest Blogger 1 Comment

Last April, I wrote (see here and here and here) about the Federal Circuit’s decision in General Mills, Inc. v. United States, 957 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2020), aff’g 123 Fed. Cl. 576 (2015). The briefs on appeal are available here: the taxpayer’s opening brief, the government’s answering brief, and the taxpayer’s reply brief. This was a complex case, involving the intersection of TEFRA partnership audit procedures and the “large corporate underpayment” (LCU interest, or “hot interest”) provisions of the Code.

There was one argument made by the plaintiff on the TEFRA issue that I addressed rather briefly, because the Federal Circuit simply swatted it away. That argument really warrants more discussion because it’s a serious problem that goes beyond just this specific context, one that we need to continue challenging: the adequacy of notices to taxpayers. So let’s talk about that case a bit more.

The Background

This is a very abbreviated version of the facts, because I want to focus on that one argument General Mills raised and the court rather perfunctorily swatted down. Interested in more? Check the opinions or prior blog posts.

The General Mills consolidated group (“GMI”) filed corporate tax returns for the 2002-2003 and 2004-2006 tax years, and General Mills Cereals, LLC (“Cereals”) filed partnership tax returns for the same years. Various members of the GMI consolidated group were partners in Cereals, so the tax returns—and any audit adjustments—for Cereals flowed through to GMI. The IRS audited both sets of tax returns for all these years. Although there are some slight differences between the audits for those two periods, for simplicity I will focus on the 2002-2003 tax returns.

Deficiencies were identified for both the corporate and the partnership tax returns. As this was back in the days before the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, the TEFRA audit procedures were still in effect. For the remainder of this post, references to Code sections in the 62xx range will be the old, pre-BBA versions, which have been replaced in the current Code by the new BBA procedures.

TEFRA “Computational Adjustments”

TEFRA required “partnership items” to be resolved at a partnership-level proceeding. After that proceeding ended, the effects of the adjustments to partnership items were translated into partner-level tax liabilities by means of “computational adjustments.” Notices of deficiency at the partner level are required only if a partner-level “determination” is required; otherwise the IRS can assess immediately. (Penalties can be assessed immediately even though a partner might raise partner-level defenses in a refund claim/suit.) Immediately assessable computational adjustments also include “any interest due with respect to any underpayment or overpayment of tax attributable to adjustments to reflect properly the treatment of partnership items.” Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-1(b).

TEFRA also provided a mechanism for taxpayers to challenge computational adjustments that did not require a deficiency proceeding, in section 6230(c). The taxpayer must file a refund claim “within 6 months after the day on which the Secretary mails the notice of computational adjustment to the partner.” Thereafter, a refund suit can be brought within the period specified in section 6532(b) for refund suits. Section 6511(g) provides that section 6230(c) applies, rather than the two-year period specified in section 6511(a), with respect to tax attributable to partnership items.

You guessed it. The partners (individual members of the GMI consolidated group) paid the assessed liabilities and then filed refund claims. Those refund claims were timely under the two-year period in section 6511, but not under the six-month period in section 6230(c). So GMI had to argue that the longer period applied.

There were a lot of different arguments by GMI that I discussed at length last April. Here, I want to focus on GMI’s argument that the six-month period never commenced, because none of the communications from the IRS qualified as a “notice of computational adjustment.”

A Brief Pause to Consider Other Types of Notices

A notice of deficiency clearly identifies the tax year, the amount of the deficiency, and the reasons for the deficiency. The IRS sends it by certified mail. It clearly identifies what the taxpayer must do to challenge it – file a petition with the Tax Court – and the period within which the taxpayer must do that. It even calculates the deadline and states it explicitly on the first page, and the taxpayer can rely on that even if the IRS erroneously calculates the date. Stat notices are not without their flaws, but this is about as good as you could hope for – the “gold standard.”

A notice of determination denying innocent spouse relief can be pretty good too. The most recent we received, by Letter 3288, was sent by certified mail and clearly identified the tax year(s) at issue and a (too) brief explanation of why relief was denied. (A request for the administrative file is definitely in order!) It clearly specified, at the top of page two, the taxpayer’s right to challenge the determination by filing a petition in Tax Court and the period within which the taxpayer must do that.

A notice of intent to levy is, frankly, horrible. They’re too long and poorly written, hard to understand for a layperson; even for some students at an academic LITC. They muddle the message by combining requests to pay with notifying the taxpayer of her rights. The next-to-last notice (CP504) is misleading, as discussed below. The final notice (LT11, CP90, etc.) explains the right to a CDP hearing reasonably well, including the period within which the taxpayer has to request a CDP hearing, but the message can be drowned out by the scare tactics elsewhere within the notice. On the positive side, both these notices at least specify their statutory basis – sections 6331(d) and 6330(a) respectively, and both must be delivered personally or by certified mail. There are other problems with collection notices, but those will do for a start.

Keith has a great blog post here about the distinction between the 6331(d) notice (CP504) and the 6330(a) “final notice” providing the right to a CDP hearing (LT11, CP90, etc.) and the history. It also points out how misleading, if not knowingly false, the 6331(d) notice is. Go read Keith’s post now if you haven’t already/lately. I like to think of the difference as that the 6331(d) notice by itself only allows the limited categories of levy described in section 6330(f), most notably state tax refunds or jeopardy collections. For those categories, a CDP hearing is available only post-levy. For all other categories, a CDP hearing is available pre-levy but the IRS must first send the 6330(a) “final notice” to allow the taxpayer to request a hearing. It’s a bit of a mess procedurally.

Math error notices are . . . well, look at this post by Keith (including the comments and the NTA blog post he links to) for some of the many defects of math error notices.

Multiple Communications

GMI, on the other hand, was dealing with a notice of computational adjustment. The Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit considered several of the communications from the IRS to GMI as possible notices of computational adjustment, either separately or collectively, that would have started the statute of limitations running.

First, on August 27, 2010, the IRS sent a letter with Form 5278, “Statement—Income Tax Changes” enclosed. That form included a line for “Balance due or (Overpayment) excluding interest and penalties” with a corresponding dollar amount, the additional tax owed by the partners from the settlement of the partnership audit. No amount was shown for interest, but the cover letter stated that the IRS “will adjust your account and figure the interest.”

The Court of Federal Claims quoted a statement in the earlier Form 870-LT (AD) settlement agreement for the Cereals audit that the taxpayer consented to the immediate assessment of deficiencies in tax and penalties “plus any interest provided by law.” I emphasized that last phrase because the court did. Three times, once for each place that phrase occurred on Form 870-LT (AD). Pause for a moment and consider the reaction if a settlement agreement or notice of deficiency had not specified the exact amount of tax and penalties and merely said “the amount of additional tax and penalties provided by law.” And here, there was enough ambiguity about what the law provided regarding “hot interest” that “provided by law” was not sufficient anyway.

Second, the IRS assessed the adjustments to GMI’s returns, flowing through from the partnership audit and including interest, on September 3, 2010. The assessment, of course, would have just shown up as a lump sum. I defy anyone to reverse engineer the calculations underlying an interest assessment on a large corporate return, including flow-through adjustments from a partnership. It can be done, but anyone in their right mind would give up long before they reached a solution. GMI proceeded to pay the assessed amounts on April 11, 2011.

Finally, on April 18, 2011, the IRS sent GMI detailed interest computation schedules. As described, those were probably sufficient to identify the IRS application, which GMI disputed, of the “hot interest” provisions. (This discussion focuses on the 2002-2003 tax years. For the 2004-2006 tax year, the IRS sent two different sets of interest computation schedules, the first one of which implied that “hot interest” wouldn’t apply at all.)

GMI’s Argument

What was missing from all these communications? The August 27, 2010, letter didn’t state the amount of the computational adjustment. The September 3, 2010, assessment gave the total amount of interest assessed, which did not break out the portion attributable to the increased tax and penalties included in the computational adjustment and was insufficient to identify how the IRS calculated that amount. The April 18, 2011, interest computation schedules did provide sufficient information to identify what GMI considered in error. None of them were explicitly identified as a “notice of computational adjustment.” None of them specified the applicable statutory provision. None of them specified the deadline for filing a refund claim, a deadline that was different from the normal statute of limitations for filing refund claims.

When I compare this notice of computational adjustment (at least with respect to the interest amount) to other notices described above, it seems: (a) significantly worse than the notice of deficiency and an innocent spouse notice of determination; (b) arguably worse than collection notices; and (c) at least as bad as some of the worst examples of math error notices. Being “no worse than math error notices” is not a good standard for the IRS to strive for.

GMI argued that

a notice of computation adjustment must (1) contain the amount of adjustments, (2) contain a statement of the increased rate of interest that will apply, and (3) provide the partner with some indication that the document is intended to be a notice of computational adjustment that triggers a 6-month period of limitations under § 6230(c)(2)(A).

It cited McGann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 745 (2007) as establishing that standard.

The Federal Circuit Was Not Convinced

The court noted GMI’s arguments but rejected them because those asserted requirements went beyond the statutory text.

GMI contends that the notices were defective for various reasons. First, GMI says that the IRS was required to give notice that “a jurisdictional period was being triggered,” and the schedules failed to mention § 6230(c) or the six-month limitations period. GMI also argues that the schedules were tainted by the failure to mention the Partnership proceedings and the failure to separate the accrued interest on underpayments resulting from the corporate proceedings from that of the Partnership proceedings. These contentions lack merit. The Court of Federal Claims stated that the notice of computational adjustment need not be in any particular form, and we agree. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code does not define what a notice of computational adjustment should contain.

(citations omitted) At most, the court would have required “the information [GMI] needed to assess whether the IRS may have erroneously computed the computational adjustment,” but it concluded the various communications provided that.

The court’s apparent conclusion that a notice, unless it is misleading, need only comport with statutory requirements is disturbing. McGann stands for the proposition that there is a minimum requirement of due process that may exceed statutory requirements. The Federal Circuit distinguished McGann as involving a misleading notice of computational adjustment and concluded the notices sent to GMI were neither misleading nor contradictory. It didn’t mention the statement from McGann that “the notice of balance due bears no indication that it is to be taken as a notice of computational adjustment, nor does it disclose that Mr. and Mrs. McGann would have had to contest any amounts said to be due within a six-months’ period thereafter.” The McGann court also pointed out that “neither the Form 4549A nor the accompanying Form 886-A previously sent to Mr. and Mrs. McGann contained such an advisory.” The McGann court also looked to cases involving notices of deficiency as “instructive” in determining whether a notice of computational adjustment was adequate.

Conclusion

I can understand why Congress and the IRS might not specify, and courts might be reluctant to impose, rigorous requirements for notices of computational adjustment. With respect to additional tax and penalties, the amount of the aggregate adjustment was already determined in the TEFRA proceeding. The partner-level adjustments seem merely mechanical and unlikely to be in error. But it doesn’t make sense with respect to complex interest computations, which were not addressed in the TEFRA proceeding. That rationale is probably also the unstated reason for why the IRS treats math error notices so cavalierly. But we know those math error notices also increasingly include adjustments that go far beyond the simple mechanical adjustments that have an extremely high likelihood of being correct.

Not only math error notices but also notices of computational adjustments require improvement, beyond the statutory requirements, to protect taxpayer rights. We can and should work with the IRS and Congress to achieve better notices. But pushing for the courts to recognize and enforce higher standards is also a worthy fight, even if it may feel like tilting at windmills.

Filed Under: Math error, Notice of deficiency, TEFRA Tagged With: Bob Probasco

Refund Claims and Section 7508A

January 19, 2022 by Guest Blogger 3 Comments

Bob Probasco, a regular guest poster, has joined Procedurally Taxing as a contributor. In today’s post, Bob unravels the intersection of the suspension rules of Section 7508A and the refund lookback limits in Section 6511. Les

In normal years, the President may make multiple regional disaster declarations; in 2020, we had a nationwide disaster declaration related to the COVID pandemic. Our work environments and financial security were affected dramatically, as were IRS operations. The IRS generally provides taxpayers broad-based relief under section 7508A after such disaster declarations. That has resulted in more than a few PT blog posts on the complexities of those provisions (see here, here,here, here, and here for just the tip of the iceberg; you can find several more if you go to the top of the blog webpage and type “7508A” or “7508A(d)” into the Search box).

The National Taxpayer Advocate submitted her 2021 Annual Report on January 12, 2022. As Les noted, it really is required reading for those interested in tax administration. Alas, I’ve fallen behind in my reading, but someone brought one particular legislative recommendation in the 2022 Purple Book to my attention. The #10 legislative recommendation (starting at page 30) proposes an amendment to avoid problems arising from the interaction between section 7508A and refund claims.

The problem and the proposed fix

As we all remember, there are two different statutes of limitations with respect to refund claims in section 6511. Section 6511(a) describes how soon a refund claim must be filed – three years after the return was filed. (If the refund claim is not filed by then, it will still be timely if paid within two years of a payment by the taxpayer. That option is not relevant to this discussion.) That deadline is clearly one that the IRS has discretion to suspend. § 301.7508A-1(c)(1)(iv). For the pandemic, the IRS exercised that discretion in Notice 2020-23.

But there is the second limitation. Section 6511(b)(2) limits how much the taxpayer can recover, even from a timely filed refund claim. When the claim is timely filed within three years after the return was filed section 6511(a), section 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount of the recovery:

If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.

If you filed your tax return for 2018 (without an extension) late on June 10, 2019, a refund claim will be timely if filed by June 10, 2022. A refund claim timely filed on June 10, 2022, can only recover amounts paid by June 10, 2019: three years preceding the date the refund claim was filed and without adjustment because there was no extension of time to file. For many taxpayers, most if not all payments (withholding, estimated taxes, or payment with return or extension request) will have been made on or before April 15, 2019, and are deemed to be paid on that date. Thus, the taxpayer has very limited if any recovery on that timely filed refund claim.

Ah, but for 2019 tax returns, we had until July 15, 2020, to file returns, as a result of a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 7508A. If we filed our return on July 15, 2020, it was timely because of section 7508A. If we later file a refund claim on July 15, 2023, the refund claim would satisfy the first limitations requirement, in section 6511(a). Thus, both the return and the refund claim were filed timely. Oops! The “lookback” period is “3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.” Section 7508A doesn’t extend the deadline for filing returns. It suspends or postpones it. And it doesn’t change the fact that most payments were deemed paid on April 15, 2020. A suspension is not an extension. So the lookback period only goes back to July 15, 2020, but payments of withholding or estimated taxes were deemed paid on April 15, 2020. Result – limited or no recovery after a timely-filed return and a timely-filed refund claim. Of course, that’s probably not what Congress had in mind – maybe Congress didn’t consider it at all – but Chief Counsel Advise 2020-53013 concluded that’s exactly what would happen.

Thus, the Taxpayer Advocate Service recommended that Congress amend section 6511(b)(2)(A) to increase the lookback period by the period of any postponement of the filing deadline under section 7508A. The legislative recommendation makes perfect sense and I whole-heartedly agree with it. Unfortunately, that leaves us dependent on Congress. Even if the proposed fix is enacted, it may take a while. In the meantime, taxpayers may be losing legitimate refund claims because they didn’t understand the Service’s interpretation of the rules. The deadline for refund claims associated with 2019 tax returns is still more than a year away, but some taxpayers received section 7508A relief for their 2018 tax returns and the deadline for refund claims for those returns is only three months away.

Non-legislative fix?

While we wait to see if Congress will enact the NTA proposal, is there anything that the IRS could do in the meantime to solve the problem? I think perhaps there is, although TAS may have already discussed non-legislative fixes with the IRS and been rebuffed. And we still want the statutory fix as much more certain.

We’ve mostly focused on declarations under section 7508A as postponing filing and payment deadlines. The actual language of Section 7508A(a) states that the Secretary “may specify a period of up to 1 year that may be disregarded in determining” three things:

(1) whether any of the acts described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) were performed within the time prescribed therefor (determined without regard to extension under any other provision of this subtitle for periods after the date (determined by the Secretary) of such disaster or action),

(2) the amount of any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to the tax for periods after such date, and

(3) the amount of any credit or refund.

The first two are fairly obvious, but how does disregarding a period of time change the determination of the amount of a credit or refund, instead of just whether the refund claim was timely?? The only thing I can think of offhand – other than overpayment interest, for which that period specified by Treasury is explicitly not disregarded – is the lookback limitation for refund claims.

The regulations include an example where section 7508A relief was granted to disregard a period including the refund claim deadline. See § 301.7508A-1(f), Example 5. A timely refund claim for 2008 would normally have to be filed no later than April 16, 2012. Due to an earthquake, the IRS determined that deadlines from April 2, 2012, through October 2, 2012, were postponed to October 2, 2012. That included the section 6511(a) deadline for filing a refund claim. The example concluded that the lookback provision was effectively changed by section 7508A(a)(3). The specified period was disregarded for purposes of the lookback provision.

Moreover, in applying the lookback period in section 6511(b)(2)(A), which limits the amount of the allowable refund, the period from October 2, 2012, back to April 2, 2012, is disregarded under paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this section [which duplicates the statutory language].

Moreover, in applying the lookback period in section 6511(b)(2)(A), which limits the amount of the allowable refund, the period from October 2, 2012, back to April 2, 2012, is disregarded under paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this section [which duplicates the statutory language].

It’s notable that the regulation just states that the specified period is disregarded, rather than any distinction between “suspension” or “extension” that the CCA relied on. Although they were not dealing with the same fact pattern, the regulation and the CCA seem fundamentally at odds. (There’s no discussion of the regulation in the CCA, so perhaps the author didn’t check it. That’s easy to understand; email advice by its very nature cannot require the same depth of careful analysis and review.) Before concluding that we have a regulation that we can rely on, though, there are a few questions to address.

First, does the suspension of the lookback period determined in the regulation depend on it being explicitly stated by the IRS in its determination under section 7508A, or is it an automatic result of the determination of that specified period? The example doesn’t mention an explicit statement in the determination; it only references the regulation language that duplicates the statutory language. There was no mention of the lookback period in Notice 2020-23, which perhaps suggests that the IRS normally doesn’t make such an explicit statement about the lookback period. That in turn perhaps suggests that the IRS considers the result as automatic and need not be stated in the determination. It’s not entirely clear, but before having researched it further I think the better answer is that it’s automatic.

Second, does the result in the regulation only apply if a disregarded period includes the deadline for the refund claim (fact pattern in the regulation) or also if a disregarded period includes the deadline for filing the original return (fact pattern in the CCA)? The CCA didn’t try to distinguish the regulation, but perhaps it could/would have.

The rationale for a longer lookback period in the former situation is that, absent the disaster, the taxpayer could have filed the refund claim within three years of timely filing the return and satisfied the lookback rule. The rationale for a longer lookback period in the latter situation presumably would be different. A disaster in the year that the return was filed wouldn’t make it more difficult for the taxpayer to file the refund claim three years later. I think the rationale rests on the disadvantage to taxpayers who are familiar with the basic 3-year statute of limitations for refund claims (often widely publicized by the IRS and tax practitioners each year) but unaware of the lookback rule.

So, there’s some uncertainty. I would certainly be willing to argue in court for the result proposed by the NTA, even without a fix. The regulation ties the language of section 7508A(a)(3) to the lookback limitation for refunds. The “amount of any credit or refund” in the statute is not explicitly limited to a refund claim filed during that disregarded period. Section 6511(b)(2)(A) is structured so that the taxpayer’s refund is not limited if she files her return timely and files the refund claim timely. Why should that principle be invalidated because the taxpayer was in a disaster area when the return was filed?

But I would feel more comfortable with at least a regulatory fix, while we’re waiting for a legislative fix. The IRS could amend the regulation to provide an example reaching the result described by the NTA, and perhaps state explicitly the effect on the lookback rule in any determinations pursuant to section 7508A. Perhaps the IRS could reconsider that CCA from 2020.

In determining the language for the legislative and/or regulatory fix, Congress and/or the IRS will also have to answer a third question. For the 2019 tax year, for which the return is due in 2020 and a refund claim would have to be filed in 2023, which determinations by the IRS disregarding a period pursuant to section 7508A will have that same effect on the lookback period? A determination with respect to a disaster in 2023 that includes the deadline for filing a refund claim? Yes, per the existing regulation. A determination with respect to a disaster in 2020 that includes the deadline for filing the return? Yes, per the NTA’s recommendation. What about disasters in 2021 and 2022? Draft carefully if you want to exclude those.

Filed Under: Disaster, refund claim, Statutes of Limitation Tagged With: Bob Probasco

Goldring Is Back – With a Circuit Split

January 7, 2022 by Guest Blogger 4 Comments

Last year, I wrote a couple of blog posts (here and here) about an order by the Eastern District of Louisiana: Goldring v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177797, 2020 WL 5761119 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020). A significant amount was at issue, so the Goldrings appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which issued its decision recently: Goldring v. United States, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29832, 2021 WL 4520343 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021).

The primary issue in the case was the proper treatment of a settlement award resulting from a 1997 cash-out merger of a privately held corporation in which Ms. Goldring owned shares. Instead of taking the offered amount, she sued the company and its directors, asserting claims of unfair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking either the fair value of those shares or to retain her 15% stake. The state court held that her shares were worth more than twice the amount she was offered in the merger.

In 2010, she received a total award of almost $41 million, including $13,684,800 for the fair value of her shares, $26,252,741 for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest (“Interest Award”), and various other fees and costs. The taxpayers reported the entire award on their 2010 tax return as a long-term capital gain. The IRS audited the return, concluded that the Interest Award should have been reported as ordinary income, and assessed a deficiency of $5,250,549 plus interest in 2017. The taxpayers challenged that deficiency in a refund suit, but both the district court and the Fifth Circuit ruled for the government on this issue.

But that’s not what I’m here to tell you about. I’m here to talk about the procedural issue of how underpayment interest should be computed on that deficiency.

The underpayment interest issue involved the treatment of “credit-elect transfers.” The rule for this is relatively unknown, as it is set forth only in caselaw and a Revenue Ruling, rather than in the Code. The plaintiffs in this case sought to expand the rule (a) beyond the situations in which it was first applied and (b) in a way that the only Circuit Court to have ruled on the question had rejected. That earlier decision was FleetBoston Fin. Corp v. United States, 483 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The district court in Goldring followed the majority decision in FleetBoston and granted summary judgment to the government. The Circuit Court overruled the district court on this issue and ruled consistently with some lower court cases and the dissent in FleetBoston.

More details are available at the earlier blog posts, but for now here’s a simplified version of facts that would raise the issue:

Taxpayer files tax return for Year 1 (after requesting extension) on October 15th, showing tax liability of $220,000 and payments (withholding or estimated tax payments) of $270,000, for a net overpayment of $50,000.
Taxpayer elects to have the $50,000 applied to estimated taxes for Year 2, instead of getting a refund.
IRS audits the Year 1 tax return and determines that the proper tax liability was $260,000 instead of $220,000, a $40,000 deficiency.

Section 6601(a) says that underpayment interest is imposed if the “amount of tax imposed . . . is not paid on or before the last date prescribed for payment.” As of that last date prescribed, April 15th of Year 2, Taxpayer had paid $270,000 against the re-determined tax liability of $260,000. Under a literal reading of the statute, the government can’t impose deficiency interest at all. However, courts decided to interpret section 6601(a) to mean that interest started running when the tax was “due and unpaid.” This itself was, of course, a favorable result for the government, which otherwise couldn’t collect any interest at all.

The tax became “unpaid” not on April 15th of Year 2, but when the $50,000 was applied to a different tax year. On the effective date of the credit – equivalent to a refund for Year 1 and payment for Year 2 – the $50,000 left the account for Year 1 and was moved to Year 2. At that point, the tax liability as redetermined is $260,000 and the payments, net of the credit, are only $220,000. At that point, the tax is “due and unpaid” and underpayment interest starts running.

But what was the effective date of that credit to Year 2? The date that the return for Year 1 was filed, making that election to apply the overpayment shown on the return to Year 2’s estimated taxes? The date of the specific installment of Year 2’s estimated taxes that Taxpayer chose as where the overpayment should be applied? Something else? Eventually, the courts and the IRS reached a taxpayer-favorable rule, which was recorded in Revenue Ruling 99-40 :

When a taxpayer elects to apply an overpayment to the succeeding year’s estimated taxes, the overpayment is applied to unpaid installments of estimated tax due on or after the date(s) the overpayment arose, in the order in which they are required to be paid to avoid an addition to tax for failure to pay estimated income tax under sections 6654 or 6655 with respect to such year.
. . .
When a taxpayer reports an overpayment on its income tax return, interest will be assessed on that portion of a subsequently determined deficiency for the overpayment return year that is less than or equal to the overpayment as of: (1) the date on which the Service refunds the overpayment without interest; or (2) the date on which the overpayment is applied to the succeeding year’s estimated taxes.

The assumption was that, if the transfer from Year 1 were not needed because Taxpayer’s other payments were sufficient to cover the Year 1 tax liability, the remainder would be refunded. But what if it weren’t? Let’s revisit that simple example.

Taxpayer files tax return for Year 1 (after requesting extension) on October 15th, showing tax liability of $220,000 and payments (withholding or estimated tax payments) of $270,000, for a net overpayment of $50,000.
Taxpayer elects to have the $50,000 applied to estimated taxes for Year 2, instead of getting a refund.
Taxpayer doesn’t need the $50,000 to meet its obligations for estimated taxes in Year 2. It is part of an overpayment for Year 2 that Taxpayer elects to have applied to estimated taxes for Year 3, instead of getting a refund.
Taxpayer doesn’t need the $50,000 to meet its obligations for estimated taxes in Year 3, either. It is part of an overpayment for Year 3 that Taxpayer elects to have applied to estimated taxes for Year 4, instead of getting a refund.
IRS audits the Year 1 tax return and determines that the proper tax liability was $260,000 instead of $220,000, a $40,000 deficiency.
Taxpayer doesn’t need the $50,000 to meet is obligations for estimated taxes in Year 4, either. It is part of an overpayment for Year 4 and the government applies $40,000 of the overpayment to pay the deficiency in Year 1.

That, in simplified form, is what the Goldrings did. They anticipated that the IRS might conclude that the Interest Award was ordinary income, so they left money with the IRS to cover any eventual deficiency and avoid interest on that deficiency. Making a deposit would have been a more certain way to avoid interest on the eventual deficiency, but that’s not what they did.

The caselaw and Revenue Procedure didn’t address this situation. A few lower courts, and the dissent in FleetBoston, concluded that underpayment interest for the Year 1 deficiency wouldn’t start running until it was applied to Year 4 effective as of April 15th, 2015 – the last date prescribed for payment. Under that approach, the amount of interest Taxpayer had to pay on the $40,000 deficiency was minimal. The majority in FleetBoston, however, said once Taxpayer decides to transfer the $50,000 from Year 1 to Year 2, that amount should be treated as leaving the account for Year 1 and moving to the account for Year 2 no later than the date prescribed for payment for Year 2. The district court in Goldring agreed with FleetBoston, but the Fifth Circuit didn’t.

The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was not entirely clear. I argued in the earlier blog posts on the district court decision that a ruling contrary to FleetBoston might be reasonable. For example, a court might conclude that the previous line of rulings – a one-time application of the overpayment to estimated taxes for the following years – could be extended to situations when a taxpayer continuously rolls the amount forward for several years. The earlier courts determined that the overpayment moved to Year 2 as of the date the taxpayer would receive a benefit (avoiding the penalty for failure to pay estimated taxes) in Year 2. If there was no benefit in Year 2, because it is neither used for estimated tax obligation nor refunded, the IRS treats the transfer from Year 1 as effective on the unextended filing date for Year 2. Would the same principle apply to cover rollovers to Year 3, Year 4, etc.? That is, is the money treated as remaining in the account for Year 1 – and the tax liability there is not “due and unpaid” – until the taxpayer receives a benefit in a future year, either by application to estimated taxes or refund? Possibly, although that is not consistent with how these amounts are reported on Form 1040 for Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, etc. But the Fifth Circuit did not rule narrowly in that way.

The court focused on a broad statement of the purpose of interest. “Under the use-of-money principle, a taxpayer is liable for interest only when the Government does not have the use of money it is lawfully due.” Mentioning “use-of-money” is guaranteed to raise the hackles of DOJ Tax Division, which rejects taxpayer arguments to treat this as a broad equitable principle rather than a limited tool of statutory interpretation.

I think the caselaw for the most part is consistent with DOJ Tax Division’s viewpoint. Some of the so-called use-of-money cases have made broad statements such as that, but their actual holdings have been much narrower. They involved either (a) determining the effective date of changes in tax liability, as later than when underpayment interest generally starts or (b) determining the effective date of changes in the amount paid. Category (a) revolves around whether the change is due to “subsequent operational events”; category (b) involves crediting an overpayment to the following year’s estimated taxes, the first simplified example above. Courts have for the most part used the principle to interpret specific statutory provisions in unusual circumstances, rather than as an all-purpose argument for equitable results.

The court did not think much of the government’s argument. “Further, like the FleetBoston majority, the Government’s argument in this case fixates on theoretical migration of credit-elect overpayment funds from one tax year to another.” I think describing it as “theoretical” is a bit much. One of the long-standing, fundamental principles of tax administration is that tax liabilities and payments are accounted for separately by taxpayer, type of tax, and tax period. Movement of funds, from one tax period to another, is subject to specific procedures and restrictions. This treatment of credit-elect transfers is no more “theoretical” than applying any funds received from a taxpayer to the tax period the taxpayer specifies.

As support for its conclusion, the court stated that the government “completely ignores the simple, undisputed fact that the IRS was never deprived of its use of the money the Goldrings lawfully owed it at any point during the five-year underpayment interest assessment period.” I think the court is effectively asserting a broad “netting” principle – that an overpayment in any tax year can be used to offset an underpayment in another tax year to reduce interest on the latter.

The problem with this argument is that the netting provision enacted by Congress has a narrower scope and arguably prohibits what the Fifth Circuit did in Goldring. Section 6621(d) states:

To the extent that, for any period, interest is payable under subchapter A and allowable under subchapter B on equivalent underpayments and overpayments by the same taxpayer of tax imposed by this title, the net rate of interest under this section on such amounts shall be zero for such period.

This only applies, based on its literal terms, when interest is payable on the underpayment and allowable on the overpayment. But the amounts transferred to Year 2, then Year 3, then Year 4 never would have accrued overpayment interest, under the regulations for such transfers. (Second 6621(d) is really for the benefit of corporations, who for the same period might pay a higher interest rate on underpayments than the interest rate they receive on overpayments.) You can argue for a broader application of netting between tax periods than provided by section 6621(d), but that conclusion is not necessarily easy to reach. The question you have to answer: If Congress didn’t intend to exclude that possibility, why did they include the limitation that interest must be payable on the underpayment and allowable on the overpayment?

I’m not opposed to the result per se, but I’m not convinced by the opinion. I would prefer to see a more analytical approach along one or both of these lines – narrow expansion of the previous line of cases; or broad netting between tax periods. I would prefer that the decision recognize and address the difficulties and limitations in reaching that answer, rather than rely on a broad equitable principle. However, the courts decide these issues, not me, and the judges are normally generalists, rather than tax experts. As the Fifth Circuit said in Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974):

Ours has been the more mundane assignment of contouring the codified curlicues of Subchapter S to the Code’s synoptic minutiae. Being mere mortals unendowed with cosmic tax wisdom, we have performed our task as well as our fallible mentalities and compositions will permit.

Where do we go from here? The government filed a petition for a rehearing en banc on November 18th. Based on the DOJ Tax Section’s opinion of “use-of-money,” I wasn’t at all surprised. There is, of course, no guarantee that the court will grant a rehearing or that the en banc court would reach a different decision.

So, assuming the decision is not reversed by an en banc rehearing, we have a new circuit split. In recent years we’ve seen a lot of activity with respect to a different interest issue for which a circuit split developed. I doubt that we’ll see the same swift development here that we saw there; there are fewer of these “rolling credit-elect transfer cases” than taxpayers seeking to bring stand-alone suits for overpayment interest in district court. But we’ll see.

Filed Under: Interest Tagged With: Bob Probasco

When Is a Late Return Not Really “Late”?? – Part 2

December 6, 2021 by Guest Blogger 1 Comment

Bob Probasco picks up from his post last week and continues discussing the tricky issue of when interest starts to accrue on refunds when the taxpayer may not have known that they had a return filing obligation on the due date of the return. Les

And now some observations and questions about that recent IRS legal memo on an overpayment interest issue. The memo relied substantially on two cases addressing similar situations: MNOPF Trs. Ltd. v. United States, 123 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Overseas Thread Indus. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 221 (2000). (The Overseas Thread scenario is virtually identical to that in the memo.) Normally, taxpayers receive overpayment interest from the filing due date of the return, if all payments that make up the overpayment were made by then. These cases involved a statutory provision, Section 6611(b)(3), under which if the return is filed late, taxpayers do not receive overpayment interest before the date the return was filed.

MNOPF established the principle that a return cannot be “late” if the taxpayer was not required to and did not file a tax return. Overseas Thread addressed the situation of a foreign corporation that did not have a U.S. trade or business and therefore was not required to file an income tax return – but had to do so to claim a refund of excessive withholding tax on dividends from a U.S. source. The court in that case determined that the tax return filed to claim a refund of an overpayment was only required by the normal filing date, and therefore late if not filed by then, if the taxpayer knew of the overpayment before the prescribed filing date. Part I provided background on those two cases and the legal memo. I think Overseas Thread and the memo leave a lot of questions, and they may be incomplete or even wrong. Those rulings also could be applied much more broadly than the specific fact pattern they address.

What About Delays After Discovery?

Neither Overseas Thread nor the memo directly mentioned another obvious question. Is the lack of knowledge, by the return due date, of a filing obligation a “blank check” for filing the return at a much later date? In Overseas Thread, the delay between discovery of the filing obligation and filing the return was relatively short – at most from early October to mid-February. What if TFI and OTI had waited another year or two to accrue additional interest?

The potential for a taxpayer to “park” money with the IRS at long as possible, earning interest at rates higher than the taxpayer could earn otherwise, may seem very counter-intuitive to those of us who deal with low-income taxpayers. Their primary objective is getting a refund quickly, not the amount of interest payable. But Treasury/IRS has expressed a similar concern in some contexts in the past. (Perhaps that’s what Section 6611(b)(3) is all about – preventing such actions. An alternative interpretation might be that it’s the flip side of the penalty of Section 6651(a) for filing a return late, which has no teeth when there was no balance due on the return. I don’t think I’ve ever looked at the legislative history, and that might not explain it anyway.)

The analysis in Overseas Thread seems to allow this very behavior. If the taxpayer didn’t know of the filing obligation by the normal return due date, Section 6611(b)(3) won’t apply. Perhaps in another case with a longer delay between discovery of the filing obligation and filing the return, a court might impose a requirement to file within a reasonable time – but it might not. If it did, that would further complicate the administration of Section 6611(b)(3).

Should The Determination of Whether a Return Was “Late” Depend on the Taxpayer’s Knowledge?

Les pointed out in his post that a knowledge standard – when the taxpayer realized there was an overpayment for that tax period – is extremely difficult to administer and a bright line rule would be much better. I agree as a practical matter, but I also question whether a knowledge standard is appropriate from a theoretical perspective. How exactly did Overseas Thread come up with the knowledge standard?

Essentially, it comes down to two provisions of a regulation, that the court was trying to reconcile. The general rule under Section 6012 is that all corporations are required to file income tax returns “regardless of whether it has taxable income or regardless of the amount of its gross income.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(a)(1). One relevant provision in the regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a), creates an exception to the general rule:

A foreign corporation which at no time during the taxable year is engaged in a trade or business in the United States is not required to make a return for the taxable year if its tax liability for the taxable year is fully satisfied by the withholding of tax at source under chapter 3 of the Code.

But there’s an exception to the exception in Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(b)(2), which states that the preceding exception does not apply:

To a foreign corporation making a claim under § 301.6402-3 of this chapter (Procedure and Administration Regulations) for the refund of an overpayment of tax for the taxable year

The court came up with the knowledge standard in an attempt to reconcile those two provisions without creating preposterous or odd results. The odd result the court saw was that these foreign corporations would have to: (1) always file income tax returns, just because they might later determine that they had an overpayment; or (2) risk not maximizing the overpayment interest they receive. Of course, taxpayers frequently face the question of whether to file protective claims as a deadline approaches. And taxpayers often face consequences from delays.

As you read Part 1, you probably were thinking of United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), weren’t you? The Court there held the taxpayer, who relied on an attorney to file an estate tax return, liable for a penalty for late filing. Reliance on an advisor was not “reasonable cause” to avoid the penalty when the issue was the filing date for the return, as “[i]t requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met.” But the Court also mentioned that reliance on a tax adviser might constitute reasonable cause, when the advice was that it was unnecessary to file a return. I’ve made an argument like that in the context of gift tax. It might apply here, where the issue was whether part of the distribution was a return of capital rather than a dividend.

But Boyle involved the failure to pay penalty, which has a reasonable cause exception. There is no such statutory defense to interest. (The taxpayer in Boyle conceded the interest assessed.) The taxpayer’s knowledge or intent is very, very rarely relevant to the application of interest provisions. Perhaps the temporary higher interest rate for a “tax motivated transaction,” or the distinction between a deposit and a payment, but what else? There’s a good reason for this – interest is not a penalty, it’s simply a payment for the use of the other party’s money. It’s based on objective criteria rather than the taxpayer’s state of mind.

Thus, I’m not sure whether the knowledge standard really makes sense in Overseas Thread (and by extension, in the legal memo). I understand the court trying to reach an equitable result, but creating a difficult-to-administer standard is not an ideal solution.

What would a bright-line rule be? Well, one straight-forward answer would be that Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(b)(2) explicitly nullifies the exception to the filing requirement; therefore, the return was required, was late, and Section 6611(b)(3) applies.

Of course, that’s not the only possible bright-line rule.

Filing Obligation versus . . . ???

Take another look at Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a) and (b)(2). I think the Overseas Thread court may have been thinking that they meant something along the lines of:

Normally, you don’t have to file a return under your circumstances but if we owe you money, you’d better file a return and you’d better do it timely! We want to make sure we get the return by the usual deadline so that we can get your refund to you sooner!

Does that sound like the IRS to you? Me neither (except when Congress is pushing for quick payments, such as with the economic impact statements and the Advance Child Tax Credit). If your taxes withheld exceed your tax liability, the IRS is glad to refund that but their feelings aren’t hurt if you don’t ask for it. And indeed, some taxpayers in that situation don’t bother with filing a return if the overpayment was relatively minor, and as far as know the IRS won’t follow-up to ask about it.

Arguably, Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(b)(2) is better read as a claims submission rule. It says that the exception to filing an income tax return for that foreign corporation does not apply:

To a foreign corporation making a claim under § 301.6402-3 of this chapter (Procedure and Administration Regulations) for the refund of an overpayment of tax for the taxable year

Not “To a foreign corporation with an overpayment.” Instead, “To a foreign corporation making a claim . . . for the refund of an overpayment.” That suggests the proper interpretation would be, paraphrased broadly:

Normally, you don’t have to file a return under your circumstances, because as defined in the exception of § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a), your tax liability has been fully satisfied. If you choose to file a refund claim – the subject of § 301.6402-3 – though, you must do it on an income tax return form instead of Form 843.

That sounds more like the IRS, doesn’t it? They won’t insist on a refund claim, but if you file one, please do it on the form for an income tax return or amended return, rather than Form 843. Indeed, Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3 allowed refund claims for income tax to be made on Form 843 for many years; that possibility was only eliminated for claims filed after 6/30/76. Check out T.D. 7410, 1976-1 C.B. 384. A technical memorandum from the IRS to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury on 1/21/76, transmitting the T.D., made that purpose explicit. Case law allowed taxpayers broad discretion regarding what would be considered a valid refund claim; that itself is further support for the conclusion that an income tax return on Form 1120-F was not required in Overseas Thread. But the IRS could issue regulations to “encourage” taxpayers to file refund claims on tax returns rather than Form 843.

As noted in Part 1, in the MNOPF case, the taxpayer originally claimed the refund on Form 843. The IRS rejected that, stating: “A return must be filed to claim the refund, even if in past years you have received refunds by filing only Form 843 without a return.”

If Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(b)(2) is only about how the refund claim is submitted, but not a requirement to file an income tax return, and caselaw recognizes refund claims that aren’t on income tax returns, arguably there is no obligation to file an income tax return. Whether a refund claim is filed late is defined by Section 6511 rather than Section 6072. The “return” therefore was not filed late and Section 6611(b)(3) does not apply.

That seems like a plausible interpretation of the regulation, and personally I prefer it to that implied by Overseas Thread.

Note that this wouldn’t apply broadly to any Form 1040 showing an overpayment. There is a general obligation to file income tax returns that would apply unless Congress has explicitly stated an exception under which taxpayers need not file, such as Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a). So, if I file my income tax return (requesting a refund) late, I’m still subject to Section 6611(b)(3) and won’t receive interest for the period before the return is received.

Is This Just About Foreign Corporations With No U.S. Trade or Business?

If it were, Overseas Thread and this legal memo would have relatively little impact. But there are other situations in which taxpayers are excused from filing an income tax return, but still must do so to claim a refund. Most common: an individual or married couple whose gross income is less than the sum of the basic standard deduction and exemption amount – unless they have at least a minimum amount of earnings from self-employment. Sections 6012(a)(1) and 6017 set forth the filing obligations; unlike (domestic) corporations, individuals with no taxable income or self-employment income are excused from filing. But they may file refund claims, because of withholding and/or refundable credits, and the IRS wants those to be filed on Form 1040.

These taxpayers will usually know that they have an overpayment. Most, particularly if they have large refundable credits, will file well before the normal filing deadline. But if the overpayment is from a small amount of withholding, some may not bother until after the normal filing deadline, perhaps well after. They would likely to lose under the knowledge standard of Overseas Thread, but under the alternative plausible interpretation above, they wouldn’t.

How is the IRS handling these now? I don’t know, but a bright-line rule based on whether the return was filed by the normal filing deadline would be much easier to program. Of course, the amount of interest lost in these circumstances will be minimal in individual cases. But I’m curious. The next time one of my clinic clients has filed a tax return after the normal filing deadline, I may check the calculation of interest.

Filed Under: Interest, refund claim Tagged With: Bob Probasco

When Is a Late Return Not Really “Late”?? – Part 1

December 3, 2021 by Guest Blogger Leave a Comment

Today guest poster Bob Probasco walks us through the case law and recent IRS memo addressing a foreign corporation which files a return after a normal due date because it only later realizes it has a filing obligation. The issue is one I recently discussed but in today’s first of two parts Bob digs deeper. Les

The IRS released a legal memo recently on an issue I had never thought of before. Would a tax return by a foreign corporation claiming a refund, filed after the normal filing date, be considered “late,” when the corporation did not realize by the filing deadline that it had a filing obligation at all? That has implications for how much interest the IRS must pay on the refund. Les wrote a great post about it. As I reviewed the memo and related cases, though, I had some nagging questions that Les didn’t have time to address. (The memo was released on Friday and Les’s post was up early Monday, before I saw the memo itself on Tax Notes Today.) So, here I am.

Part 1 provides some additional background from the previous court cases and then the recent IRS legal memo. Part 2 then moves on to those questions – I always have questions – and some very tentative possible answers: this memo may not only be wrong but also apply more broadly than realized.

The legal memo follows two particularly relevant court cases, which provide a good background for the discussion.

MNOPF Trustees, Ltd.

MNOPF Trs. Ltd. v. United States, 123 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997) involved foreign entities that were trustees of pension funds of the British merchant marine. (There were two different entities involved, but from here on I will just refer to “MNOPF.”) It was a tax-exempt labor organization (Section 501(c)(5)), had no business income in the United States, and therefore was not required to file income tax returns. However, it invested in securities of U.S. corporations and received dividend payments. The custodian banks which received the payments withheld thirty percent and transmitted the withheld amount to the IRS, with an annual return on Form 1042. The banks improperly withheld the 30% from MNOPF’s dividends, since it was tax-exempt; MNOPF filed refund claims on Form 843 in December 1987 for amounts withheld on dividends paid in 1985 and 1986.

The IRS rejected the Forms 843, stating “A return must be filed to claim the refund, even if in past years you have received refunds by filing only Form 843 without a return.” The IRS also told MNOPF that it should file Form 1120-F. MNOPF refused to do so, because it wasn’t a corporation, and instead filed Form 990-T, “Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return,” in December 1989, although it did not have business income. The IRS accepted that form and refunded the amounts withheld but paid overpayment interest only from the date it received the Form 990-T, because the return was filed late, relying on Section 6611(b)(3):

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or (2) in the case of a return of tax which is filed after the last date prescribed for filing such return (determined with regard to extensions), no interest shall be allowed or paid for any day before the date on which the return is filed.

The Federal Circuit disagreed. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(1) says: “In general, in the case of an overpayment of income taxes, a claim for credit or refund of such overpayment shall be made on the appropriate income tax return.” The rest of the subsection encompasses both original income tax returns and amended tax returns as methods to make a refund claim. But there was no “appropriate income tax return” for MNOPF since the regulation did not apply to tax-exempt organizations and MNOPF had no taxable liability. The court concluded: “The Court of Federal Claims correctly held that a claim for refund is not a late-filed tax return when the organization is not required to and did not file a tax return.” Therefore, overpayment interest would start running with the date of the overpayments, rather than the date MNOPF filed Form 990-T. (Because MNOPF was tax-exempt, the date of the overpayment was the date that the custodian banks were required to file Form 1042. That was the primary distinction between MNOPF and the next case.)

Overseas Thread Industries, Ltd.

Overseas Thread Indus. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 221 (2000) moved to the subject very similar to that addressed by the IRS legal memo. OTI was a foreign corporation with its principal office and headquarters in England and a United States subsidiary, TFI. TFI made distributions to OTI in 1987, 1988, and 1989; at the time both TFI and OTI thought the distributions were taxable dividends. TFI withheld five percent of the distributions, pursuant to the US-UK tax convention, and remitted the amount withheld to the IRS along with Form 1042. OTI did not file an income tax return for those three years, because it was not engaged in a U.S. trade or business.

Sometime in the last quarter of fiscal year 1990 – roughly October through January – OTI determined that a portion of the distributions were non-taxable returns of capital, on which tax should not have been withheld. TFI filed amended Forms 1042 at the end of January, and OTI filed Forms 1120-F in mid-February, reporting the amounts of the overpayments. The IRS issued refunds in early 1992, but later demanded that OTI repay a portion of the associated interest, concluding that overpayment interest would start running only when the Forms 1120-F were filed in 1991, thereby treated as “late returns.”

In its briefs for the cross motions for summary judgment, OTI argued that the returns were not “late.”. That applies when the returns are not “required,” according to MNOPF. OTI pointed to Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a), which creates an exception to the general rule that corporations must file income tax returns:

A foreign corporation which at no time during the taxable year is engaged in a trade or business in the United States is not required to make a return for the taxable year if its tax liability for the taxable year is fully satisfied by the withholding of tax at source under chapter 3 of the Code.

That makes sense. The corporation is taxable on income that is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business at 30% (or lower if specified in a treaty). The payor is required to withhold at that same amount. The net amount will be $0; why require an income tax return?? (At least, that’s my recollection from my law school class on International Tax. I haven’t really looked at that in the last 21 years.)

But the government, in its briefs, pointed to Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(b)(2), which states that the preceding exception does not apply:

To a foreign corporation making a claim under § 301.6402-3 of this chapter (Procedure and Administration Regulations) for the refund of an overpayment of tax for the taxable year

The court concluded this was a “quandary” and stated its task as “to harmonize these provisions into a coherent whole that achieves the object of the regulation, yet does not yield preposterous or odd results.” The government’s interpretation, though, leads to an odd result. Foreign corporations that apparently qualify for the exception of Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2)(i)(a) would have to file a return at the filing due date anyway, simply because “an overpayment may be discovered in the future.” (emphasis added) Failing to do so would “forfeit its ability to maximize interest on any resulting overpayment.”

The court’s solution: if the corporation were making a claim for refund “during the requisite filing period” it was required to file an income tax return by the normal deadline. If the corporation “later discovers the existence of an overpayment after the close of the applicable income tax return filing period,” it would have to file a return to claim the refund but the return would not be considered a late-filed income tax return and Section 6611(b)(3) would not apply. Apparently, the parties did not dispute when OTI discovered the overpayment, so the court’s solution decided the case in OTI’s favor.

The New IRS Legal Memo

I don’t think the memo really decided much beyond Overseas Thread. It cited and quoted that case, along with MNOPF, and basically relied on those decisions. The one thing perhaps new in the memo was that it was more explicit than Overseas Thread, in recognizing that the application of that rule might require information that the IRS might not have. The field unit requesting advice did not specify that information, so the memo’s answer was not conclusive.

As Les pointed out in his post: “The knowledge standard raises significant challenges for tax administrators who may not be able to determine that knowledge on the face of a return.” I agree whole-heartedly. Particularly in cases like these, interest may be computed with minimal or no interaction with the taxpayer. The computer may (?) automatically apply Section 6611(b)(3) based on the information available without anyone intervening to ask when the taxpayer became aware that there was an overpayment. It would be up to the taxpayer to realize the IRS position was inconsistent with case law and claim additional interest. I also would very much prefer a bright line rule.

In Part 2, I’ll turn to how the Overseas Thread court might have reached it decision without having to apply a knowledge standard. I think that decision – or at least the rationale – arguably was wrong. If so, that also suggests a particular direction in which the bright line rule should run. Part 2 also addresses why this issue could affect many more taxpayers than foreign corporations without a U.S. trade or business.

Filed Under: Interest, refund claim Tagged With: Bob Probasco

Subscribe to our Blog

Filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien For Personal Property

Background

Where to file an NFTL

Compare to notices of deficiency

Back to the Stephenson case

Creativity Is Not Always Rewarded

Background

The first two (my order) arguments

Creativity!

Standard/scope of review – CDP versus innocent spouse

No Rehearing En Banc for Goldring: Is Supreme Court Review Possible?

You Call That “Notice”? Seriously?

Refund Claims and Section 7508A

Goldring Is Back – With a Circuit Split

When Is a Late Return Not Really “Late”?? – Part 2

When Is a Late Return Not Really “Late”?? – Part 1

Support the Center for Taxpayer Rights

Support TAPS

Leslie Book

Keith Fogg

Christine Speidel

Stephen Olsen

Contributors

Nina Olson

Samantha Galvin

Caleb Smith

Guest Bloggers

Follow Us!

Post Topics

Helpful Links

Subscribe to our Blog

Background

Where to file an NFTL

Compare to notices of deficiency

Back to the Stephenson case

Share this:

Background

The first two (my order) arguments

Creativity!

Standard/scope of review – CDP versus innocent spouse

Share this:

Share this:

Share this:

Share this:

Share this:

Share this:

Share this:

Support the Center for Taxpayer Rights

Support TAPS

Leslie Book

Keith Fogg

Christine Speidel

Stephen Olsen

Contributors

Nina Olson

Samantha Galvin

Caleb Smith

Guest Bloggers

Follow Us!

Post Topics

Helpful Links

Share this: