We welcome first time guest blogger Brian Krastev, a 3L at Syracuse University College of Law and a student of past guest blogger Professor Robert Nassau. Christine
United States v. Estate of Sidney Elson, No. 2:18-cv-11325 (D. N.J. 2019) addresses the statute of limitations on collection of gift taxes from donees. The case involves a father who failed to pay the gift taxes on substantial gifts he made to his children (I hope my father knows that I’d gladly handle his gift tax return if he’d like to send me substantial gifts). The children acknowledge that their father did not pay the gift taxes but argue, inter alia, that the statute of limitations in IRC 6324(b) prevents the IRS from pursuing collection against them. The district court finds that, so long as the statute of limitations on collecting from the father has not expired, the IRS can still seek to obtain the taxes from the children. Unpaid gift taxes bear many similar traits to unpaid estate taxes. In both cases, when the donor or executor is unable to pay the tax, the donees or heirs are personally liable to the extent of the value of the property they were gifted or bequeathed.
read more...Sidney Elson gifted two individuals each about $500,000 worth of property in 2004. He died in 2006 never having filed a return for either gift. Sheila Strauss, one of the two gift recipients and executrix of his estate, filed a gift tax return on behalf of the estate in 2009. This return included the gifts made in 2004, but it only reported $80,000 of tax liability. The IRS sent the estate a notice of assessment in 2011 for $375,000 in additional gift taxes. Despite the estate making payments toward the liability, the IRS alleged that as of December 4, 2017, $685,000 remained outstanding. The IRS brought a suit in 2018 to collect the taxes from, among others, the aforementioned two donees.
The two defendants filed a motion to dismiss which, although procedurally improper, the court decided to consider as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion is based primarily on two issues: (1) That the IRS suit is untimely because the ten-year period of limitations on a gift tax lien under IRC 6324(b) had expired; and (2) that the IRS failed to individually assess them pursuant to IRC 6901, and any such assessment would now be untimely.
§ 6324(b) provides:
[Sentence 1] Unless the gift tax imposed by chapter 12 is sooner paid in full or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time, such tax shall be a lien upon all gifts made during the period for which the return was filed, for 10 years from the date the gifts are made. [Sentence 2] If the tax is not paid when due, the donee of any gift shall be personally liable for such tax to the extent of the value of such gift. [Sentence 3] Any part of the property comprised in the gift transferred by the donee (or by a transferee of the donee) to a purchaser or holder of a security interest shall be divested of the lien imposed by this subsection and such lien, to the extent of the value of such gift, shall attach to all the property (including after-acquired property) of the donee (or the transferee) except any part transferred to a purchaser or holder of a security interest.
§ 6901(a) provides, in pertinent part:
[Donee gift tax and certain other] liabilities shall…be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were incurred.
Section 6901 goes on to provide a statute of limitations on assessment, which is generally “within 1 year after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the transferor.” IRC 6901(c).
The district court interprets IRC 6324(b) in accordance with U.S. v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2002), a practically identical case, which analyzes the “personal liability provision” (sentence 2) separately from and without reference to the “lien provision” (sentence 1). In doing so, the court determines that the 10-year period of limitations in sentence 1 does not apply to the personal liability provision of sentence 2. Instead, IRC 6501 (generally 3 years to assess after a return is filed) and IRC 6502 (generally 10 years to collect after assessment) provide the appropriate statutes of limitation. The court finds that the gift tax assessment against the estate, and the filing of this action against the estate and donees, were timely under sections 6501 and 6502.
This court also finds that a personal assessment under IRC 6901 is not a prerequisite to bringing an action against the donees under IRC 6324(b). It reaches this conclusion following U.S. v. Geniviva, 16 F.3d 522 (3d Cir. 1994), which held that a section 6901 assessment was not mandatory before the government could bring an action under IRC 6324(a)(2) (the estate tax sister to 6324(b)). The court notes that section 6901 was enacted after section 6324, and finds that in the later section Congress merely provided an additional tool for the government to collect against transferees. The court entirely rejects the donees’ view of section 6901 as a limitation on section 6324.
This court concludes that the action is timely against the donees because the statute of limitations under IRC 6502 on collection from the donor had not expired when the suit was filed. Additionally, the IRS was not required to personally assess the donees under 6901 to pursue collection from them in a suit under section 6324. Therefore, this court holds that the collection action against the defendants is timely and procedurally proper.
Something about this decision rubs me the wrong way. It seems unfair that donees—potentially oblivious to a donor’s neglect to pay taxes—can be on the hook for a tax liability many years down the line, a tax liability which has likely amassed penalties and interest far in excess of that originally due.
Specifically, in this decision I find troubling the following three points:
1. Botefuhr’s separate analysis of personal liability
The Tenth Circuit justified distinguishing sentence 1 and sentence 2 of IRC 6324(b) by referencing several cases dealing with collection of unpaid gift taxes from donees. However, the statute of limitations on collection was not at issue in these cases. In fact, the actions against the donees were all brought within 10 years from the date of the gifts at issue, while the “sentence 1 lien” was in effect. It seems more likely that the reason these cases independently addressed the personal liability sentence of IRC 6324 is because the donees disputed their personal liability altogether. For example, the court cites to the following:
- La Fortune v. C.I.R.,
263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958).
- Primary issue is valuation of gifts. Secondary issue is whether the IRS can collect unpaid gift tax from donees where donor is solvent and where the gift tax liability arose from gifts made to other donees during the year.
- Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
C.I.R., 147 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1945).
- Issue is whether the IRS can collect unpaid gift tax from donees where donor is solvent, failed to report taxable gifts, and was not assessed.
- Baur v. C.I.R.,
145 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1944).
- Issues are whether the IRS can collect unpaid gift tax from donees where the the tax liability arose from gifts made to other, the statute of limitations on collection from the donor has expired, and the donor is solvent.
- Tilton v. C.I.R.,
88 T.C. 590 WL 39956 (1987).
- Issue is whether the IRS can collect unpaid gift tax from donees in general.
2. Botefuhr’s application of IRC 6501 and 6502 to donee personal liability
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply the 10-year statute of limitations on the gift tax lien of sentence 1 to the personal liability of sentence 2 by referencing cases which found that IRC 6502 established the statute of limitations for collection from donees. However, would the court have done the same for the lien transfer of sentence 3? Sentence 3 directly refers to the gift tax lien created by sentence 1 and transfers it to all the donee’s property if the gift is transferred out of the donee’s possession. I speculate that the 10-year statute of limitations would surely carryover to sentence 3. In that case, it makes less sense to isolate the personal liability of sentence 2 and apply the donor’s statutes of limitations of IRC 6501 and 6502.
3. Geniviva’s treatment of IRC 6901 as an additional collection method
The Third Circuit in Geniviva found that an individual assessment under IRC 6901 was not required to collect unpaid estate taxes from donees. This decision was based on Leighton v. U.S., 289. U.S. 506 (1933), a case which dealt with personal liability of unpaid estate taxes in the context of corporate distributions. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Leighton was interpreting section 280(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926—the precursor to IRC 6901. The Third Circuit could have probably distinguished the case for these reasons.
In discussing these reasons with my tax professor, Professor Robert Nassau, he made a very compelling counterpoint which I initially overlooked. He raised the argument that the gift taxes in these cases are rightfully owed and it would be unfair to expect the IRS to track down every relevant donee whenever a gift tax deficiency is alleged. To hold otherwise might incentivize donors to gift all their assets, never pay the tax, and ignore the IRS in hopes that the statute of limitations expires on collection from the donees.
Ultimately, I think a more equitable approach would be to treat IRC 6324 as the additional method of collection, apply the 10-year statute of limitations of that section to the personal liability it imposes, and mandate assessment under IRC 6901. This would provide donees with the same procedural safeguards on assessment and collection available to taxpayers in every other instance. The IRS would still have ample time to collect from donees under IRC 6901—the downside being they would have to assess them much sooner.