Why a Win for CIC Services Would Be a Win for Tax Shelters

We welcome a group of guest bloggers who filed an amicus brief in CIC Services earlier this week.  Professors Susie Morse, Clint Wallace and Daniel Hemel and attorneys at Gupta Wessler filed a brief on behalf of former government officials Lily Batchelder, Mark Mazur, Eileen O’Connor, Leslie Samuels, Stephen Shay and George Yin.  Today, they provide us with an explanation of why the Supreme Court should uphold the decision of the 6th Circuit, which held that the Anti-Injunction Act bars CIC Services’ suit.  The Supreme Court has now scheduled this argument for December 1, 2020.  Keith

This week, a group of former government officials filed an amicus brief in support of the government in CIC Services v. IRS, the Anti-Injunction Act case before the Supreme Court this term. The case involves a tax shelter promoter that seeks to prevent the IRS from imposing penalties on the promoter and its clients if they fail to comply with tax-shelter reporting requirements. A ruling for CIC Services would, as the Solicitor General emphasizes in its brief, go a long way toward gutting the 153-year-old Anti-Injunction Act. It would also—as our brief demonstrates—deal a serious blow to the IRS in the agency’s decades-long battle to combat abusive tax shelters.

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Ever since the first wave of abusive tax shelters gathered momentum in the 1960s, Congress has taken a series of actions to give the IRS tools to fight back. Those include the at-risk rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the passive activity loss limitations in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and, at issue here, the reportable transaction disclosure regime in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Specifically, in the 2004 law, Congress required tax shelter promoters and their clients to disclose certain large-dollar shelter transactions to the IRS, and it enacted new penalties so that those disclosure requirements had teeth. Of particular importance to this case, Congress placed those penalties in Subchapter 68B of the Code, which means that they qualify as “taxes” for purposes of the AIA.

The disclosure regime was, by most accounts, a resounding success. Prior to the disclosure rules, the IRS often found itself “looking for the tax shelter needle in the haystack of a complicated business tax return.” By requiring parties who arrange and participate in specific potentially abusive transactions to identify themselves to the IRS or face stiff penalties, Congress made it possible for the IRS to find the needle. To be sure, taxpayers still have the opportunity to argue that their transactions claim legal tax benefits. What they can’t do any more is keep their transactions outside the IRS’s view.

The reportable transaction scheme is designed to be agile. Congress wanted the IRS, upon learning of a new shelter, to require disclosure from promoters of the shelter and their clients. Congress specifically blessed the IRS’s practice of issuing reportable-transaction designations under already-existing authority (section 6011). That regime provides for issuance of designations by the IRS via notice in the Internal Revenue Bulletin—backed by penalties under the AJCA for failure to comply. Indeed, the IRS has designated dozens of transactions in this way, starting before Congress enacted the penalties for failure to report in the AJCA and continuing in recent years. CIC Services’ substantive argument is that the IRS should promulgate these notices through Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking rather than relying on the section 6011 framework. We think the AJCA endorsed the IRS’s approach. But in any event, the only issue here is whether CIC Services can obtain a pre-enforcement injunction that would block the IRS from imposing penalties for nondisclosure.

Allowing pre-enforcement challenges to these penalties—i.e., allowing taxpayers to challenge reportable transaction designations and to delay revealing to the IRS their participation in such transactions—would have severe consequences for the effort to fight abusive tax shelters. As we detail in our brief, injunctions of the sort that CIC Services seeks would yield three specific effects. First, they would prevent the IRS from detecting many abusive transactions. Second, when injunctions delayed detection, it would be likelier that the statute of limitations would lapse before the IRS could assess taxes that are rightfully owned. Third, in cases where the IRS is able to assess taxes before the statute of limitations runs out, delaying assessments would increase the risk of non-collection. The longer the delay, the likelier it is that taxpayers will have spent down their assets or moved their wealth beyond the IRS’s reach.

The petitioner wants to cast its effort in a different light. By its telling, the case has nothing to do with tax shelters at all. Petitioner tells the Court in its brief that its micro-captive products allow for “customized” risk management and a “more seamless claims process,” though it advertises itself to clients as a provider of a “legal tax shelter” that “can often double a business owner’s wealth.”

As readers of Procedurally Taxing know, petitioner’s argument received support from Professors Fogg and Book, who joined with the Center for Taxpayer Rights in an amicus brief opposing the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the AIA. Their brief argues that low-income taxpayers are especially disadvantaged when forced to rely on the AIA’s required remedy of post-enforcement judicial review. As Professor Fogg has written, under the Flora full-payment rule, in practice this can mean that post-payment judicial review for low-income taxpayers who face failure-to-report penalties is out of reach. And as Professor Book has written, the government’s approach to enforcing the tax law applicable to low-income taxpayers may excessively target taxpayers who make unintentional mistakes and lack access to constructive government guidance about how to comply.

Like Professors Fogg and Book, the authors of this blog post are concerned about the interaction between tax law enforcement and the situations faced by low-income taxpayers. But we think the remedy is to relax the full-payment rule in cases where it forces hardship for low-income individuals, and not to exempt CIC Services from the Anti-Injunction Act’s plain text.

The immediate result of a ruling for CIC Services would be to make it easier for tax-shelter promoters and their predominantly high-income clients to avoid paying the taxes they owe. That would result in less revenue overall, and more of the federal tax burden would be borne by lower-income taxpayers. The distributive result would be regressive.

Also, a ruling for petitioner is unlikely to provide relief for low-income taxpayers fighting the IRS. Petitioner’s theory is that it is challenging a “regulatory mandate” unrelated to its own tax liability. “Win or lose,” petitioner says in its brief, “the IRS will collect no additional revenue from CIC.” Petitioner accepts that taxpayers litigating about their own liabilities are covered by the Anti-Injunction Act but asks the Court to distinguish tax shelter promoters like CIC Services who are litigating about penalties for failure to disclose other taxpayers’ transactions. 

We agree with the government that the distinction that CIC Services draws is not a valid one. (Whether CIC Services wins or loses will affect the ability of the IRS to collect penalties from CIC Services itself under §§ 6707 and 6708—penalties that Congress has deemed to be taxes.) But let’s imagine that the Court disagrees and accepts CIC Services’ argument. That helps tax shelter promoters, but what does it accomplish for low-income taxpayers seeking to claim the earned income tax credit or the child tax credit? They are arguing about their own taxes and tax credits. 

In addition, a ruling for the government in CIC Services would leave undisturbed any equitable exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, which would allow low-income taxpayers to seek prepayment remedies in a case of clear government overreach. In the Bob Jones case, the Court said that such an equitable exception could be available where a plaintiff can show both a “certainty of success on the merits” and “irreparable injury.”  CIC Services has not sought that exception, and as our brief argues, it would not be eligible anyway. But Bob Jones may provide relief for low-income taxpayers in situations like the ones that Professors Fogg and Book highlight.  

The AIA lies at the foundation of federal tax administration and the modern tax shelter disclosure regime. That regime relies on a nimble IRS, backed by the threat of penalties for failure to disclose. Permitting tax shelter promoters to resist disclosure requirements with strategic lawsuits and pre-enforcement injunctions would mean trouble for tax collection.

White House Oversight of Tax Regulations

One of the more significant tax procedure developments of the past year is the new centralized OMB review  that applies to some tax regulations. In this post, Professor Clint Wallace from the University of South Carolina School of Law describes the new framework and notes the many areas that await further clarification. Clint discusses this in greater detail in Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, forthcoming in the Alabama Law Review. Clint is an important voice in the academy on tax administration and tax procedure. His article Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking appeared this past year in the Tax Law Review. In that piece Clint discussed the special institutional capacity that the Joint Committee on Taxation plays in tax legislation, situating the JCT in the context of administrative law and principles of statutory interpretation. Les

Earlier this month, the Treasury Department and the Office of Management and Budget announced a “new framework” that appears likely require many more tax regulations to undergo OMB review.  In other contexts—for example, environmental or workplace rules—this sort of consultation between agency regulation-writers and OMB is commonplace.  Dating back to the Reagan administration, centralized review has been mandated for many regulations.  (The fountainhead of OMB’s authority to impose this review is Executive Order 12,866, which has been modified in some minor respects by subsequent EOs, but remains in effect).  When OMB reviews a “significant” regulation, it requires the drafting agency to quantify the costs and benefits of the rule, and it facilitates a process whereby other departments can weigh in on the proposals.  But OMB has never before required tax regulations to be subjected to this sort of review.

Some political commentators saw the framework as OMB winning a turf war against Treasury, and some tax professionals reacted with dismay that additional layers of analysis will delay new regulations.  Delays are a particular concern in the tax community right now because Treasury is scrambling to produce reams of important regulations to fill in the many blanks that Congress left when it hastily enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act at the end of 2017.

But treating this as either an issue of shifting political power or simply a matter of stretching out a bureaucratic process both undersells and oversells the potential import of this move.  As of now, no one really knows what it means for the implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, nor for the development of regulatory tax policy more generally.

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The framework has three major components.  First, it requires Treasury to keep the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (the office within OMB charged with central authority to review regulations)abreast of its agenda by submitting quarterly “notices” of all “planned tax regulatory actions.”  This, of course, does not mark a significant change from current Treasury and IRS practices: Treasury and the IRS already produce an annual “Priority Guidance Plan,” with quarterly updates.  Further, these documents are already robust and useful versions of the sort of regulatory agenda-setting prescribed under Executive Order 12,866: Treasury does a good job of soliciting public input on agenda items, makes fairly accurate predictions of its capacity, and follows through on the items it places on the agenda. It looks like the new framework does not change anything about this agenda-setting process, but rather simply mandates that Treasury should provide the (already publicly available) agenda and updates directly to OIRA.  The framework specifies that “[a]t the election of the OIRA administrator, Treasury will engage in substantive consultation with OIRA regarding any” regulatory action that appears on the agenda.  It is not clear from the memorandum what such engagement might consist of; regardless, such engagement was not prohibited previously.

The second component of the framework is that it provides that OIRA will review any regulatory actions that “create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency,” or that “raise novel legal or policy issues, such as by prescribing a rule of conduct backed by an assessable payment.”  The treatment of this category of tax regulatory actions corresponds with the treatment of “significant” rules under E.O. 12,866.  Along similar lines, the third element of the framework requires that regulatory actions that have “an annual non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more,” be subject to the comprehensive review that is required for “economically significant” regulations under E.O. 12,866.  This review calls for the drafting agency (i.e., Treasury) to produce quantified cost-benefit analysis of the proposed regulation and alternatives.   The framework provides OIRA with 45 days to review each rule, with additional time provided as necessary, and allows Treasury to request an “expedited” 10-business-day review—this is notably shorter than the standard 90-day review period provided for regulations from other agencies, which suggests Treasury and OIRA were mindful of timing concerns expressed from the tax community.

These changes potentially mark a sea-change in the process for producing tax regulations.  However, many important details—which could impact the effectiveness and significance of this new world of centralized review—remain to be determined.  Most prominently, the categories of tax regulatory actions subject to review are ill-defined:

  • The first category of tax regulations that OIRA plans to review—i.e., the category that aligns with “significant” regulations under Executive Order 12,866—applies if a proposed regulation presents a “serious inconsistency” with action taken by another agency. But it is unclear how OIRA will distinguish between serious and minor potential inconsistencies.  The other definitional prong is similarly vague: a “novel legal or policy issue” appears straightforward, but is then exemplified as a “rule of conduct backed by an assessable payment.”  In tax administration, such a rule is not novel; it is a tax or a penalty.  It is unclear whether OIRA intends to (or believes it is authorized to require) review of any rule that can affect the amount of tax or penalty owed, or if this is more limited.
  • The second category of tax regulations includes no explanation of how the “non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more” will be calculated. The first descriptor, “non-revenue effect” makes clear that revenue estimates are not relevant.  Presumably this means that Treasury will be focused on the costs and benefits of compliance and behavioral changes.  If Treasury relies on its existing compliance cost estimates, this requirement will simply weight review towards regulations that affect more taxpayers.
  • Further, the $100 million amount is measured again a “no action” baseline, but it is unclear what sort of action that refers to—Does that mean a state of the world where Congress has not enacted a provision that requires regulatory action?Or where Congress has acted but Treasury provides no further guidance?  If it is the latter, then the baseline will often be defined by partial compliance with a law as enacted.

Additionally, a central feature of centralized review is quantified cost-benefit analysis.  But for most tax regulations, current CBA practices will not yield any benefits—a tax creates deadweight loss, and imposes compliance and administrative costs, and CBA does not account for benefits flowing from transfers to the government.  So how will CBA be used in the tax regulatory process?

The way that OMB and Treasury construe these provisions could be the difference between almost all regulations proposed this year and next being subject to centralized review, or almost none, so these are significant questions.

The framework allows OIRA to defer the “economically significant” style of review for up to a year (until April 2019), in order for Treasury and OIRA to hire necessary personnel. And shortly after the framework was released, OIRA announced that Kristin Hickman is acting as an advisor, presumably sorting through these sorts of issues.  I address many of these challenges in my forthcoming piece Centralized Review of Tax Regulations(this linked version is newly updated – the previous version was written prior to the release of Trump administration framework).