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TIGTA Report Shows IRS Has a Long Way to Go On Employment Related Identity Theft

Posted on July 17, 2017

The other day I wrote about the Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee and its annual report showcasing many successes and improvements IRS made when it came to identity theft. Part of the success ETAAC discussed included a major drop in identity theft receipts, which the report suggests is the product of better detection at the front end of the return filing process. TIGTA, in a report from last month, highlights a different story when it comes to employment related identity theft. Essentially TIGTA found that IRS materially understates the number of employment-related identity theft cases and has had major systemic flaws in informing victims.

What is employment related identity theft? As most readers know, to gain employment one must have valid Social Security number. Individuals who are not authorized to work in the US sometimes use other peoples’ Social Security numbers to secure employment. They then file a individual income tax return using an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN). Individuals whose SS numbers are used by someone else can be in for a surprise after they file a tax return (or do not file due to not having an obligation to file) when IRS may send an Automatic Underreporting (AUR) notice reflecting the income that was earned by someone else who illegitimately used their SS number.

IRS procedures are supposed to catch returns that are submitted by an ITIN user that reflect someone else’s SS # associated with wages. In IRS speak, that is known as an ITIN/SSN mismatch. When all works well, IRS places an identity theft marker on the victim’s account, and prevents victims from getting an AUR notice.

TIGTA found that all does not work well, with a number of systemic issues associated with placing markers on accounts. It examined over a million e-filed returns that had an SS/ITIN mismatch and found that in about 51.8% of the time IRS put the appropriate identity theft marker on the account. The IRS did not place markers on the remaining 48%; that was because many in that 48% group did not have a tax account (Note IRS defines tax account as an active account as one “for which the taxpayer’s Master File account, which contains the taxpayer’s name, current addresses, and filing requirements, etc., exists on the IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information.”).

Of the e-filed returns, there were another 60,000 or so victims who did have a tax account but still did not have an id theft marker placed; IRS noted various reasons, including its placing only one marker per return even if the return filed has multiple incorrect SS# associated W-2s and that some of the victims were minors and IRS did not have procedures in place to inform minors.

TIGTA sensibly recommended that IRS take steps to improve its process of placing id theft markers on all e-filed returns. IRS generally agreed with the recommendations and said it would monitor progress “and determine, by July 2018, the requisite programming changes needed to ensure that identity theft markers are properly applied when the potential misuse of an individual’s SSN becomes evident.”

In addition to e-filing issues, TIGTA noted major problems that the IRS has had in placing identity theft markers when a return reflecting an ITIN/SS mismatch is not e-filed:

Specifically, guidelines state that a Form W-2 is not required for Line 7 (Wages, Salaries, Tips, etc.) of Form 1040. As such, the IRS has no way to identify ITIN/SSN mismatches associated with paper tax returns. In addition, if the ITIN filer voluntarily attaches a Form W-2 with an SSN, IRS internal guidelines do not require employees processing these returns to place an employment identity theft marker on the SSN owner’s tax account.

TIGTA recommended that IRS require ITIN filers to attach W-2s with their 1040’s; IRS rejected that recommendation because it noted that “wages constitute taxable income under Internal Revenue Code Section 61 and are reportable even when a Form W-2 is not provided or is otherwise unavailable at the time of return filing.” IRS did, however, agree to put better procedures in place when a paper filed ITIN return does in fact include W-2s that reflect a mismatch.

Conclusion

The TIGTA report shows that IRS has a lot of room for improvement. People need to be vigilant, as IRS in many cases does not take action even if it has information that reflects a high likelihood that someone is improperly using a Social Security number. As TIGTA notes, if IRS fails to place an identity theft marker on an account, “victims can be subjected to additional burden when the IRS processes their tax returns.” It may trigger confusing and stressful notices and limit the ability for IRS and others to help victims unwind the effects of the identity thief. IRS needs to do a better job here, as the costs for victims in time, stress and potentially dollars are likely very significant.

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